

**ASPIRATION
SURVEY
FOR SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO
2004**



**FRIEDRICH
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Center for Policy Studies**



Aspiration
Survey for Serbia
and Montenegro
2004

Belgrade, May 2004

Foreword

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The Survey should be the beginning of a countrywide* debate about how to reconcile two opposite perceptions of the role of government in Serbia and Montenegro. Despite the fact that this Survey was realized in July 2003, the statistical trends highlighted here have been proven constant during the recent past. The need for answers to these vital questions led UNDP to cooperate with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Policy Studies in supporting and carrying out this Aspiration Survey. On one hand, there is a powerful expectation that government must play a pervasive role in dealing with a long list of social and economic issues. As the survey notes "On issue after issue the people of Serbia and Montenegro express strong approval for the forms of social organization and the standards of social provision of developed European 'social democratic' practice." The vision of the 'providing state' is pervasive in questions about who is responsible for job provision in the future, the priorities of the state or the responsibility for individual destiny. Within this expansive conception of the proper role of the state, there is nearly universal agreement that social support should be increased and more than half of those surveyed view increasing social security as the first priority of government.

On the other hand, there is a sharp distaste for politics, politicians and political parties. The Survey indicates that there is little belief in the legitimacy and competencies of individual or party political actors. Beyond formal party politics, there is a low level of interest or willingness of individuals to engage in public activities, including interest group organizations, trade unions and NGOs of any type. These opposite views of government and the more broadly defined public sphere are held by the same people. This inconsistency is at the heart of a dilemma that threatens the ability of any government to initiate or sustain a serious reform programme in Serbia and Montenegro.

Measures to pursue economic reform will quickly force government to make decisions that will shape society for a long time. This Survey suggests that to the extent traditional 'transitional' policies are followed, they will be contrary to both the specific and general views and preferences of much of the population. Attempts by a political elite and system that are operating with low levels of public approval to impose a 'free market' model through rapid reforms, including mass privatisation of publicly-owned assets and various forms of 'state shrinkage' will simply alienate or enrage large numbers of citizens. Even if such policies are welcome abroad, they are unlikely to contribute to the re-establishment of a functioning civil society of informed assent and real participation. When decisions are being taken that determine the structure of society into the distant future, transparency in government conduct and public understanding of and basic agreement with the choices made are especially important.

This is a place and time where the need for countrywide commitment to fostering democratic and participatory governance practices leaps to the fore. Governance is not simply a technical process of administration. A healthy political process must be built on informed consent that can only emerge from honest consideration of alternatives and debate. That said, mapping the aspirations of citizens and drafting a vision of the future society and state cannot be completed on the basis of a single survey. This Survey is envisaged as a starting point for a broader debate among all of the actors, national and international, involved in defining the future of Serbia and Montenegro.

A clear picture of people's aspirations will also provide a basis for assessing the social and political agenda of different political parties. It will also provide the international actors who are involved in different aspects of the transition with an analytical framework to assist in understanding both the complexity of the challenges and the feasibility of the particular approaches adopted. Finally, greater respect for public preferences in the policy-making process can bring with it greater hopes for adoption of policies that are sustainable and able to nurture healthy social and economic growth.

* This Survey was not carried out in Kosovo, which is separately administrated in accordance with the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244. The term "countrywide" should be understood to cover Serbia and Montenegro excluding Kosovo, and without prejudice on its final status or Serbia and Montenegro's sovereignty.

Aspiration Survey for Serbia and Montenegro 2004

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Introduction: Why this report?

For nearly the entire first “transition” decade Serbia found itself in the uncomfortable role of *enfant terrible* of the Balkans. Western public opinion was comfortable with an easily digestible black-and-white picture of the complex transformation in the Balkan region with its “overload of history”. The Milošević regime eagerly provided arguments for such a superficial understanding, capitalizing on its oversimplifications and drawing additional internal legitimacy from several clichés that had Serbian nationalism as their common denominator. At a certain point, the real attitudes and aspirations of the society were replaced by their politically manipulated interpretations, which were then attributed back to the general public.

When that regime crumbled and the country begins to catch up in the process of transition, it is essential to identify and articulate the people’s vision of the future. What are the characteristics of the world in which the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro would like to live — what is the desired form and character of the “desired society”? What form of state organization can provide the opportunity to achieve these goals? What are the “civilisation values” that can provide the “value framework” for this new society? What is the cultural and geopolitical “location” – East or West? What are the preferred life strategies of the people?

Answers to these questions are crucial during the current phase of transition. First, a clear picture of people’s aspirations provides additional (and relevant) background for assessing the social and political agendas of different political parties. Second, it will provide international actors who are involved in different aspects of the transition with an analytical framework that can assist in their understanding of both the complexity of the challenges and the feasibility of the particular approaches adopted. Third, it will provide important feedback for the politically active part of the society – those willing to express their opinion not just occasionally, during major elections. Finally, it could provide additional elements of legitimacy to some of these approaches.

The size of the sample covered, the extensive questionnaire and the special regional sub-samples provide a rich and complex resource to help in interpreting the contemporary social and political reality of Serbia and Montenegro. Often the results are straightforward and self-evident, but in a number of other cases, there are either high numbers of non-responses to particular questions or ambiguity in the phrasing of the question that creates doubt about what information the respondents understood they were being asked to provide. In the former case we have used the term “valid responses” to indicate that the percentage distribution has been calculated on the basis of the views of those who expressed a specific opinion on that one question, not the basis of the total number of survey participants. In statistical tables, we have indicated the number of respondents who offer “No answer” as a percentage of the total sample. This is often problematic because “no response” can mean very different things: a technical error in filling out the form; ignorance of the subject matter of the question; a clear sense that none of the options offered match the actual situation; or the belief that different outcomes are equally likely. “No answer” may also reflect shame or unwillingness to express a clearly held but socially proscribed view. In the case of ambiguity in the question itself, we have noted this as part of the text describing the specific response to that question.

Nature of the survey, sample and methodology

The Survey was conducted in July 2003. The target population of the survey was the population aged 18 and above in Serbia (without Kosovo) and Montenegro.

The sample (representative for total population, Serbia and Montenegro and with regional boosters for Subotica and Leskovac) was constructed on the basis of the 2002 Register (Serbia) and 1991 Register and the Essential statistics 1991-2001, as well as evaluations for Montenegro.

The sample type: stratified three-staged random sample with special booster for Subotica and Leskovac. Strata: Regions and settlement types. The regions are Montenegro, Vojvodina, Belgrade, Western Serbia, Sumadija, Eastern Serbia and Southern Serbia.

Elites have been identified from that random sample. During the cross-tabulation, a group of citizens has been isolated on the basis of their average income and education.

	Planned sample	Realized sample incl. regional boosters	Realized sample representative of the total population
Serbia	1310	1274	1274
Subotica	230	200	30
Leskovac	230	195	30
Montenegro	310	304	304
Total	2080	1973	1638

Selection stages:

1st stage: Polling places, with the probabilities of sampling proportional to the number of registered voters in 2002. Selection method: Systematic cumulative method (PPS, sampling with probabilities proportional to size).

2nd stage: Households with equal probabilities of sampling according to the random path model, with the given starting point and a straight line using streets and house numbers. (Simulating SRSWoR sampling scheme), and

3rd stage: One adult member from a selected household with equal probabilities of sampling, using the Kish scheme with sampling table (simulating SRSWoR sampling scheme).

The authors of the analysis contained in this Survey are: Mr. Srecko Mihailovic, MA in Sociology; Mirjana Vasovic, PhD in Psychology; Sonja Licht, Sociologist; Stjepan Gredelj, PhD in Sociology; Zoran Stojiljkovic, PhD in Political Science; Petar Djukic, PhD in Economy; Gradimir Zajic, Sociologist; Milan Nikolic, Sociologist. Andrey Ivanov, Human Development Adviser at UNDP Regional Office in Bratislava, contributed to the editing of the Survey.

The field survey in Serbia was conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies field network, led by Nadezda Bogdanovic, sociologist. In Montenegro, the network of the Belgrade based institution Strategic Marketing conducted the Survey.

Once the first draft of the Survey was ready, in November 2003, a number of Government, civil society, academia and donor representatives were identified to participate in a Reader's Group, whose purpose was to discuss the draft document and enrich its analytical content. A Reader's Group meeting took place on 6 November 2003, with the participation of: Mr. Andrey Ivanov, from UNDP Regional Office in Bratislava; Ms. Gordana Čomić, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia; Mr. Hachemi Bahloul, Programme Officer at UNDP Country Office in Serbia and Montenegro, Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, from the Balkan Trust for Democracy; Ms. Sonja Licht, from the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence; Ms. Juliette Hage, Deputy Resident Representative at UNDP Country Office in Serbia and Montenegro; Mr. Lazar Šestović, Research Analyst at the World Bank; Mr. Milan Nikolić, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies; Mr. Miroslav Spasojevic, Senior Advisor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro; Prof. Marija Bogdanović, Rector of the University of Belgrade; Prof. Mijat Damjanović, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science; Prof. Srdjan Bogosavljević, Chief Executive Officer of the Strategic Marketing & Media Research Institute; Mr. Radimir Burić, Assistant Resident Representative at UNDP Country Office in Serbia and Montenegro; Mr. Srdjan Darmanović, from the Centre for Democratic Transition in Montenegro; and Stjepan Gredelj, Analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies. All participants provided their comments, which were incorporated into the Survey.

Executive Summary

This large survey of the personal, community and national aspirations of the populations of Serbia and Montenegro was conducted in 2003. It shows the extreme complexity of the current circumstances and the danger of attempting rapid structural reforms in the absence of a supporting social consensus.

Geopolitics and the choice of a “civilisation” model

The results of the survey confirm the well-rooted pro-European trend in Serbian and Montenegrin society. The strong and explicitly expressed choice of a ‘European’ orientation is one of the main findings of the research. The aspirations of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens are not just for a ‘Western’ model of civilization and social organization but have a definite European dimension. Of respondents who have clear opinions, 85% supported the idea of Serbia and Montenegro joining the European Union in one form or another.

Further evidence of this orientation toward Europe is provided by specific countries named as appropriate models for Serbia and Montenegro. A clear majority name European democracies as their model, with EU member states chosen by 68% of the respondents and Central European countries chosen by 11%.

Regarding the specific political model there is a wide consensus in favour of republican parliamentary system of government as the basic framework. An anti-democratic scenario has little support, even in the short term. Only 4% agree that “the army should rule the country, at least for a while”. A wide consensus exists on the desirability of bringing experts into some key government positions. However, there is no consensus for either a presidential (or semi-presidential) or a parliamentary system of government. This issue is among the key questions in constitutional and political debates in Serbia and has split citizens into almost equal groups.

Hopes for the future relationship between Serbia and Montenegro

On another burning issue – the state union between Serbia and Montenegro – respondents in both republics split into two almost equal groups on the issue of “united vs. separated state”. Serbs demonstrate slightly stronger support for one united state than Montenegrins (54% vs. 52%), within an overall 53% average.

The results also reveal strong support for a market-based economic model with a visible role of the state. Asked “In which direction would you like the economic system of our country to develop?”, respondents show attitudes in favour of “free market economy” and “mixed economic model” (a market economy with a relatively strong public sector) are almost equal at 42% and 43% of the valid cases respectively. Even with the strong role of the state, the desired economic model is market-based. People may not have developed a clear idea about often subtle distinctions between the shades of the three market-based models (“pure market,” “mixed” and “state capitalism”) but they largely exclude the centralized socialist model of production relationships from their aspirations. This does not mean however a complete departure from the idea of social rights and entitlements associated usually with the social-democratic model.

The strong support for a prominent state role in the desired society includes its role as an economic actor. The responses to the question about “who should have the leading role in the new system” prove that. The role of private initiative is ranked low in people’s vision of the desirable future shape of society. The private sector has not yet become a key motive and factor in national aspirations. It is still seen more as a ‘replacement provider’ of social benefits than as a dynamic source of income generation.

Although strongly supporting an active role of central administration and state in general, people are not against decentralized solutions in areas where decentralization works better than centralized approach. The desired model is not of a centralized state but of a state with a reasonable division of prerogatives between central and local levels. The level of support for a central or a local approach depends on the specific issue, as is particularly evident in views on issues of education, health or infrastructure management.

The nature of the society in which people would prefer to live

People would like to live in a society with a lower level of criminality and corruption, capable of providing a good standard of living, good employment opportunities, and governed by the rule of law and a fair judicial system. One of the most important findings of this survey is the diminishing significance of nationalist feelings and ideas in Serbia and Montenegro¹. An extremely low share of respondents (6% with no major variations across groups) see "national interest fulfilment" as a precondition for the desired society. This suggests that there would be a low level of support for appeals made on nationalist grounds, seemingly providing a crucial precondition for tolerance and respect for diversity. However, when asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statement that "Serbia should be the state of the Serbs because Serbs are the majority", most of the respondents tend to agree (35% "completely agree" and 30% "agree to a certain extent"). Obviously, respondents confuse the name of the state with its character.² But the responses might also suggest that the nationalist potential has not vanished for good. Not surprisingly, support for this option is higher in Serbia (69%), and lower in Montenegro (50%).

Tolerance is not limited solely to ethnic issues but is directly related to social solidarity as well. The population of Serbia and Montenegro shows a high average level of solidarity and tolerance toward others and different (marginal) social groups. Intolerance is expressed more through a reserved view toward the provision of equality of rights and opportunities for certain groups than through open readiness to take part in discrimination against them.

Family and personal aspirations

People are not satisfied with their current standard of living, dividing evenly between those assessing their life as "good" or "tolerable" and those who find it "hardly bearable" or "unbearable". An interesting detail of current views is visible in the disparity between the assessments of their own and household conditions and the appraisal of the conditions in the surrounding society. People tend to perceive their situation more optimistically than that of "the neighbour" or the rest of the society. This is a sign of higher levels of "individual optimism." The share assessing their own status as "good" and "tolerable" is higher than the assessment those same people provide of the conditions of the "others". There are fewer 'pessimists' in assessing their own status than there are 'pessimists' about the conditions of society in general.

The majority of citizens do not appear eager to take on business risks. The attitude towards business differentiates two groups of inhabitants: three fourths are completely "out of business" and a quarter is involved in business or trying "to get in". More than a half of the citizens do not even think about it or consider that there are no chances for them. They are very close to those who "think" about business, but consider it practically unfeasible, or don't see opportunities for their occupation in small-scale industry.

Parents have high aspirations for the education of their children – 79% of the respondents from Serbia and 81% in Montenegro (valid cases) think that the appropriate education for their children is university. The reasons for this choice are related to better opportunities associated with higher education: to find a job (25%), to acquire higher level of job security (19%) and simply to acquire knowledge (19%). It is interesting that "money" as a motive comes only fourth – perhaps because transition experience provides little evidence to support the relationship between higher education and a higher income. In this respect people's aspirations regarding education of their children echo the older tradition of viewing education as a value in itself, even if it does not provide direct material benefits.

A majority of the respondents (58% of the valid cases) state that they do not want to move abroad. This suggests that the emigration potential is low, but emigration attitudes are not equally distributed among age groups. Substantial numbers of the best educated young people still see (and are willing to look for) more opportunities abroad and such a "brain drain" could be detrimental for the future of Serbia and Montenegro if it turns into a stable tendency. Emigration is not among the envisaged scenarios for most of the people. "Translated" into the language of aspirations, it means that the definite majority sees their personal future in the country expecting to find sufficient opportunities at home. This optimistic message offers policy-makers a window of opportunity that will not last forever because a possible future "brain drain" requires their immediate attention.

Regarding gender equality, the more educated people are more inclined to support equality of sexes, while the older people are the less ready to accept gender equality. The only deviation from this general rule is found in the younger generation. One possible reason could be the asymmetry in life chances of

1 Although the Survey results point at possible diminishing significance of nationalist feelings, more recent events, in the wake of March 17th 2004 in Kosovo and the December 2003 parliamentary elections in Serbia, are cautioning against such hasty conclusions.

2 The confusion is with the name (France is the state of French people, Germany is the state of German people, thus Serbia is the state of Serbs, i.e. each nation has somewhere its mother state) and with the nature of the state, that is to say state belongs to all of its citizens with equal rights no matter which is their ethnicity or religion. This confusion is established in several surveys done by CPA/CPS.

women in different age groups with young women having more opportunities. This is reflected in higher incidence of the "equality exists" option (for the Q61 question "What do you think about gender equality in society?" among the young. But the real finding in the area of gender equality is the huge discrepancy between individual/family and societal patterns. The share of those "doing nothing" for gender equality at home is substantially lower than of those "doing nothing" about gender equality in the society. One possible explanation could be that at home women's rights are perceived as better protected and equality closer. This means that there is at least the awareness that something still needs to be done in this area. The problem however is that even if this is the case, a negligible share of respondents (both men and women) intend to do anything about that.

General conclusions

Within a strongly "European" orientation, a remarkably high number of respondents opt for a "responsible" and "providing state". This vision is pervasive in questions about job provision in the future, the proper priorities of the state or the responsibility for individual destiny. There is nearly universal agreement that social support should be increased and more than half of those surveyed view increased social security as the first priority of government.

The Survey reveals little support for an "individualistic" model of society or for another version of a state-run economic model. The expectation that the State will play a strategic role as social safety provider does not necessarily require that state-owned enterprises should remain major economic actors. A dynamic mixed economy should have room for many organizational and motivational approaches. The population should be allowed to choose among various forms of ownership and organization, including those that are neither state-owned nor individual private ownership, such as cooperatives, full or partial local government ownership of public utilities and in some cases local production facilities, and so on from the Nordic social-democratic model. The unique experience of the former Yugoslavia with various forms of employee participation and local government economic activity should not be needlessly discarded without a careful filtering to preserve those fragments that are potentially viable and forward looking. Various localized cooperative forms are a particularly promising way to build multi-ethnic engagement and commitment to activities and entities that require inter-communal amity.

The Survey indicates that there is little belief in the legitimacy and competence of individual and party political actors or of support for adoption of a sharp-edged "free market" model. Attempts of the former to impose the later, however welcomed abroad, are unlikely to contribute to the re-establishment of a functioning civil society of informed assent and real participation. When such important structure-determining decisions are being made, transparency in government conduct and public understanding of and basic agreement with the choices made are especially important.



Geopolitical orientation

Serbia and Montenegro are situated at the crossroads between “Eastern” and “Western” civilizations and ways of life. This is a central point in the notions people have about their historical position. Civilization stages were marked by centuries-long efforts to retain a separate identity within the Ottoman Empire (1389-1878). Orthodox Christianity formed a defining cultural feature from the 9th century onward³, reaching the point where religious identity almost coincided with national identity. National identity had a strong pan-Slavic theme⁴, relying on “mother Russia” from time to time. From within this framework Western Europe was frequently recognized as an alternative source of support but seldom fulfilled expectations of complete support as well as Russia as a matter of fact.⁵

The European choice

During and immediately after World War II, this pan-Slavic heritage was complemented but never totally replaced by a communist movement-based identity, centring on the Soviet Union and uniting the entire “Eastern bloc”. The conflict with orthodox Stalinist communism in 1948 quickly erected a huge political barrier between Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc and when the conflict ended in the mid-1950’s, the official orientation of the Yugoslav foreign policy was neutrality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia played a leading role in development of the politics of “non-aligned nations”, mostly Third World countries until the 1980’s.


Under the rule of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990’s, Serbia gradually entered a conflict with much of the world: first during the break up of Yugoslavia; then in the Balkan Wars; and finally in the markedly violent “solution” of the Kosovo problem. Until the Kosovo conflict, culminating in NATO’s intervention in 1999, Serbia had both Western supporters and adversaries, so this was not a deliberate civilization choice. The government utilized the ambiguity in attitudes towards “the West” and the romantic vision of Russia. Suggestions by the Milošević government that it might enter some kind of a union with Russia and Belarus at that time was an extreme manipulation of domestic public opinion, somewhat similar to Bulgaria’s suggestion decades earlier that it become the 19th Soviet republic.

3 Serbs converted to Christianity in the 9th century

4 Yugoslavia was the state of South Slavs (as its name implies).

5 Serbia originated on territory controlled by Byzantium, then within a gap between the opposed states of Byzantium and Bulgaria. In the beginning of the 12th century it was situated between Byzantium (the East, Orthodoxy) and Hungary (the West, Catholicism). There were numerous conflicts and alliances with either of these powerful neighbors. Later, from the second half of the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire took Byzantium’s place, while the northern partner remained the same, only with a different name of Austro-Hungarian Empire. This position remained unchanged until the beginning of the 20th century, i.e. until the end of the First and Second Balkan and the First World Wars.

Graph 1:
Which country should be taken as a model?



Serbian history provides sufficient grounds for the evolution of both pro-Western and anti-Western attitudes. In the 19th century, most of the new intellectual, political and economic Serbian elite received their higher education in Vienna, Budapest, Paris or other European capitals. Few went to St. Petersburg or Venice. Almost all modernizing ideas from Constitution, parliamentary democracy to nuclear physics and computer science came from the West in the backpacks of Yugoslav students returning home. Pro-Western links specially started to flourish in the 1960's, due to the open borders and the subsequent emigration by a large number of workers to the West (more than a million people by 1972). Yugoslavia abandoned the socialist practice of a closed society, and opened itself towards the world, in practice this meant toward the West. The Milošević regime in the 1990s moved sharply in the opposite direction, heavily utilizing the latent anti-Western potential and capitalizing on Western errors. When the post-Milošević Serbian government adopted a definite pro-Western orientation in October 2000 (Montenegro having done so a few years earlier), the shift towards Europe had deep historical roots and did not occur in a "value vacuum".

Even in the early 1990s, pro-European attitudes were widespread. In the last survey research carried out in the former Yugoslavia, published in 1990, half of the respondents favoured orientation toward the European Union, 14% supporting non-alignment, 6% favouring the USA, and just 1% named Russia and East European countries (Mirčev, 1990: pp. 187ff). The 1990 study showed that identification with Europe was important to 73% of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, but this share decreased to 57% in 1992 and 47% in 1993 (Bačević, 2001: 16-17). The decline is understandable in the context of the conflict within the former Yugoslavia, and European recognition of the newly independent countries after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, European attitudes towards the Balkan wars, and the sanctions introduced in the summer of 1992. It also reflected a sense of fear of the West that was not entirely irrational (reflecting the logic of the mounting circumstances of the war in the former Yugoslavia), with 46% of the respondents believing that Yugoslavia would be attacked by the Western countries, while only 38% of the respondents excluded the possibility of such an attack (JIM 26/1992).

The end of the Balkan wars and the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord revived trust in Europe and the world. While 42% of respondents agreed "it is important to be a part of Europe" and 38% disagreed in 1996, scarcely changed in 1998. Even immediately after NATO's intervention in autumn 1999, 56% of Serbian citizens supported the idea of joining the European countries, as opposed to those who preferred Russia (8%), USA (4%) or China (3%). (Mihailović et al. 2000: 197).

This well-rooted pro-European trend is confirmed by the results of this Survey. Of respondents who have clear opinions (Q31, valid answers) whether Serbia and Montenegro should become a member of the

European Union and NATO, 85% supported the idea of the country joining the European Union in one form or another with the share of those against any Western orientation at just 14% with 1% choosing the option "NATO only". The civilization aspirations of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens are more than ever turned toward Europe. Europe as soon as possible, whatever that means.


	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Non-elite
Both the EU and NATO	36%	36%	35%	50%	34%
Just the EU	49%	48%	51%	44%	50%
Just NATO	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Neither the EU nor NATO	4%	15%	12%	5%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 1:
Do you support or reject the idea of Serbia and Montenegro becoming a member of the EU and/or NATO?
(% of valid answers)

What is most interesting is not the pro-Western choice but its definite European dimension. It is visible both in the level of support for NATO as opposed to the EU and in the particular countries envisaged by the respondents as a suitable model for Serbia-Montenegro. For example when asked "Do you support the opinion that Serbia and Montenegro should become a member of the European Union and NATO?", 49% state "Only EU", 36% chose "EU and NATO" while "Only NATO" receives but 1%. The low level of support for NATO membership is not surprising after the 1999 intervention that was largely perceived as "NATO bombing", but the overall negative perception of NATO-led policy in the Balkans did not erode support for the European choice.

From civilization model to policy choice

Further evidence of the European orientation of Serbia is provided by the question about which country is an appropriate model for Serbia and Montenegro (Q30). The "super-power" options of the USA and Russia receive negligible support (10% and 4% of valid answers respectively), but EU member states were chosen by 68% of the respondents and Central European countries chosen by 11%. The latter option could be interpreted as a pragmatic one – the CE countries are now members of the EU and envisioning them as a model reveals support for their pro-EU trajectory, not simply for the living standards associated in some more general way with "Europe". This realistic and pragmatic option receives slightly higher support from elite and decision-maker respondents (15%) than from the total sample (11%). "With whom should our country harmonize its foreign policy, the USA or EU?" (Q122): 58% of the valid cases support the option "harmonize the foreign policy with the EU", reaching 74% among the elite and 71% among university graduates. Support for an "independent foreign policy" reaches 30% of the total sample and just 14% of elite and 20% of the university graduates respectively. An "independent" foreign policy is not an unqualified alternative to the EU choice, because a country could still independently choose to "harmonize" its policy meaning that harmonization is a deliberate choice of the government. Hence European aspirations are even more pronounced than would appear at first glance. Harmonization with USA is supported by only 7% of all respondents, reaching 10% in Montenegro and 6% in Serbia.



Graph 2:
Foreign policy orientation?
(% of valid answers)

The society desired by respondents is geopolitically realistic. There is no support for “Slavic unity” or a Russia-oriented model of development. European values (albeit not “Euro-Atlantic” ones) underlie and determine the attitudes. Direct support for America as a model is negligible, which in the light of the experience in the 1990s is understandable and in the current geopolitical context seems to reflect a mainstream attitude marked by scepticism about the United States.

From a policy perspective it is also important to know who does not yet have clear civilization aspirations, because this group should be the target of future communication efforts. The least decided (showing highest percentage of “do not know” answers) are housewives (46%), the poorest, i.e., those with a monthly income of less than 87 US\$ (5,000 Dinars) per household member (37%), farmers (34%), respondents with primary education only or less (33%), those who do not express any opinion about political parties (28%), people older than 60 years (26%), those with the monthly income between 87 and 174 US\$ (5,000 and 10,000 Dinars) per household member, and those living in villages (25%). At the opposite extreme are the 4% of pupils and students, 6% of Belgrade residents, 7% of the most educated, 8% of private business owners, 9% of those with the monthly income higher than 435 US\$ (25,000 Dinars) per household member, 10% of respondents 18 to 30 years of age, 10% of political party members, 11% of those with a monthly income higher than 261 US\$ (15,000 Dinars) per household member, and 11% of people living in cities of 30,000 to 80,000 inhabitants.

Political system

The civilization parameters of the preferred society however would be superficial if based just on direct “identification” questions. The real level of support for European or other options could be revealed through the detailed vision of different parameters of this society.


Citizens of Serbia and Montenegro appear to have crossed the line beyond which “democracy becomes the only game in the town” (Linc and Stepan). In the very basis of the accepted social model the vision of liberal, representative, competitive and elective democracy emerges. Citizens have some confidence in classical political institutions – the Parliament and the Government with its ministries. Asked, “who is most representative of the interest of the citizens?” (Q54, table 2), 21% of the respondents think the Parliament and its members best represent citizen interests and 14% see Government as the most representative. The total support for these major democratic institutions like Government and Parliament reaches 35% in the total sample and for Serbia, with a slightly lower level in Montenegro (33%).

Table 2:
Who best represents the interests of citizens?

	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Non-elite
Political parties	10%	10%	8%	10%	10%
NGOs	12%	11%	15%	18%	11%
Professional societies	9%	8%	14%	13%	9%
Assembly and elected assembly members	21%	21%	19%	23%	20%
Government and its ministries	14%	14%	13%	10%	14%
Courts	4%	3%	6%	5%	3%
Media – press, radio, television	5%	5%	4%	6%	5%
Other	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%
No one	25%	27%	19%	13%	26%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

The courts and the media, followed by professional societies and the political parties are seen as least representative. The low rating of the courts, especially in Serbia, indirectly reveals the significant role of the judiciary in the aspiration model and the fact that much of the reforms in this area have not been completed yet. Low trust in the courts now reflects both the political manipulation of the judicial system during the previous regime, but also the awareness that an independent and efficient judiciary has a crucial role to play in the future.

Regarding the desired political model (Q38, “in what type of societal organization would you prefer to live”), there is a wide consensus for the acceptance of republican parliamentary system of government as the basic framework. Only 9% (10% in Serbia, 4% in Montenegro) favour a parliamentary monarchy⁶. An anti-democratic scenario has no chances for success, even in the short term. The option “the army should rule the country, at least for a while” receives only 4%, with over-representation among respondents with less education.



Graph 3:
Who should govern?

However, there is no consensus for either a presidential (or semi-presidential) or a parliamentary system of government. This issue is among the key questions in constitutional and political debates in Serbia and has split citizens into almost equal groups. Respondents from Serbia slightly prefer a strong presidential option (19%) compared to a parliamentary republic (16%), but in Montenegro the situation is reversed (12% and 17% respectively). There is some connection ($C = 0.20 - 0.30$) between responses to this question and income levels, employment status, education, age or type of settlement characteristics. For instance, the “powerful president” option receives more support from the oldest, the poorest, the least educated, people from villages, housewives, farmers and retired people. A similarly weak correlation exists between attitudes toward political parties and respondent characteristics. Inhabitants of towns with populations between 30,000 and 80,000, the poorest, those living in rural areas and youths have the highest opinion about representative potential of parties, excluding of course members of the parties themselves. Belgrade residents and business people have the least confidence in political parties.

A wide consensus also exists on bringing experts into some key government positions. Between half (Serbia) and two thirds (Montenegro) of citizens wish to see experts in the government. It is a relatively permanent demand of the public, visible in public opinion research in the period before the Milošević regime was overthrown. Behind the call for professional competence, there is probably the broad sense that difficult problems have been inherited. At the same time there is disapproval of the unproductive political arguments and decisions of “politicians of a general kind”, i.e. political self-interest or incompetence. Experts are believed to have the knowledge to solve problems while politicians are seen to be only interested in staying in power.

A majority of two thirds agrees on the need to give greater freedom to the media. It shows the growing understanding among citizens of the need for existence of an autonomous and pluralistic media scene, but also their sensitivity to attempts at manipulation or “disciplining” of the media. Although the respondents pay a lot of attention to freedom of the media as a constitutive element in forming a democratic political model, and they consider the media to be one of the basic institutions of a modern civil society, they seldom see them as the main representative of their interests. Slightly more than half, mainly inhabitants of big cities, pupils and students, trust them. Free and objective media are an important element of the desired model of society that emerges from the results of this survey. It remains an open question to what extent the media are viewed more as a delivery channel or as an opinion maker.


Democratic values and political participation

Political activity and participation is an important aspect of the choice of “civilization”, particularly in a transition society. Data of this Survey show high potential in this regard. Asked “What is your relation-

⁶ The Survey did not assess support for a European-style constitutional figure-head monarchy (such as Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK).

ship/attitude to political parties?" (Q148), only 9% of the respondents state they are members of a political party, with the level in Montenegro (14%) double that in Serbia (7%). Support for a single political party reflected in the option "I am sympathizer of one party" was at 21% (19% in Serbia and 30% in Montenegro). If members of and sympathizer with parties are treated as people with clear political identification, the level of "political engagement" reaches 26% of Serbian and 44% of Montenegrin citizens. The share of people who sympathize with one party more than others is 10% for the overall sample (11% in Serbia and 7% in Montenegro). If one supposes that a party can also play a role of interest representative for their less steady supporters (citizens who consider a certain party closer to their views than the others), then more than 37% of the citizens of Serbia and more than half (51%) of citizens of Montenegro are a potential interest clientele of the parties. On the other hand, almost one half of the interviewees feel indifference or even aversion to parties, 49% in Montenegro and 63% in Serbia.

Graph 4:
Non-partisan
democracy?



Political participation is more than formal membership in or support of political parties. Participants in civil society – NGOs, unions, professional associations, social movements and initiatives – are by definition forms of self-organization. Data show that the overall level of support of such non-political entities is lower than for political parties. Asked "are you member of any not-for-profit or citizens organization?" only 11% responded positively. This is consistent with the low ranking of NGOs among the structures perceived as representative of citizens' interests (Q 54): 21% total (19% in Serbia and 29% in Montenegro) think NGOs and professional associations are the best representatives of citizens' interests

Beside numerous open questions regarding the pace of changes, or doubts about the reasonableness of specific solutions and unfulfilled preconditions, the data outline the emerging contours of a democratic political and social model of society rooted in European values. The basic problem is not the concept but its implementation. How will it be possible to retain a wide and diverse coalition in support of reform in the coming years under the difficult circumstances society will face?

The data (approached in Q11-13, table 3) show that economic issues head the ranking of the parameters the desired society should have – 58% say "decent living standards" (56% in Serbia, 64% in Montenegro) and 42% say "good employment opportunities" (40% in Serbia, 51% in Montenegro). But immediately after that comes 40% for the "rule of law" (38% in Serbia and 47% in Montenegro) followed by "decreasing as much as possible levels of crime and corruption" which receives almost equal support in Serbia and Montenegro (36% and 38%). **A surprisingly low ranking is given to the "achievement of national interests" (6% in Serbia and 4% in Montenegro). This is a major finding of the report, suggesting that society in Serbia and Montenegro has moved away from the nationalistic appeals and nationalist issues do not occupy an important place in people's aspirations.** It is also interesting that the significance attributed to "political stability" is low (26% in average, 28% in Serbia and 15% in Montenegro). The probable interpretation here is that people do not consider this to be a burning issue, suggesting long-term confidence in the ability of the country to continue its course of peaceful transformation.

	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Non-elite
A functioning democracy	14%	12%	23%	27%	13%
Good employment opportunities	42%	40%	51%	30%	43%
Political stability in Serbian and Montenegrin society	26%	28%	15%	28%	25%
Legal state – the rule of law	40%	38%	47%	45%	39%
A decent standard of living	58%	56%	64%	57%	58%
To decrease as much as possible the level of criminality and corruption	36%	36%	38%	40%	36%
A successful economy with strong economic development	33%	32%	37%	48%	31%
Social justice	14%	14%	12%	9%	15%
Achievement of national interests	6%	6%	4%	10%	6%
Does not know, does not think about that	9%	11%	2%	2%	10%

Table 3:
Which of the goals listed below should be achieved in order to create a society in which you will be happy to live?

* Respondents were allowed to give 1, 2 or 3 answers. Response percentages are calculated with reference to the total number of respondents; the resulting averages total more than 100%.



The state


The nature of the political system and its institutions are details that should fit into the broader picture of the state – a political framework within which the specific elements of the vision would be accomplished. Even three years after the fall of Milošević, the nature of this broader framework is an open issue. Serbia is still a kind of provisional state, Kosovo is a de facto international protectorate and the union with Montenegro is considered to be an experiment imposed by the European Union with a certain expiry date and unclear future prospects. Beneath the level of these “macro” issues questions of internal political structuring (the distribution of prerogatives, responsibilities and resources between central and local levels) that are relevant for any state regardless its territorial shape must also be settled.

The union of Serbia and Montenegro

The foreign relations of Serbia and Montenegro during almost 200 years of their modern existence were the result of the search for harmony between the civilization aspirations and ruthless interest games played by powerful neighbouring countries. Serbia and Montenegro rarely entered these conflicts without a strong foreign partner to rely on. This was the case even in the decisive rejection of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum after the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. In the 1990’s, Milošević was the first to give up such practice.

The political dominance of the separate project in Montenegro and a slow, highly controversial process of arranging the mutual relations between Montenegro and Serbia after the year 2000, as well as adoption of a non-typical, ultimately loose relationship protected by the representatives of EU, led to growing influence and support for the project of an independent Serbia. The dilemma about the fate of the state union after the three-year term was expressed in the question of whether Serbia and Montenegro should be one state or two independent states (Q42)?

Graph 5:
**The destiny
of the union?**



Respondents in both republics split into almost equal groups on the issue of “united vs. separated state” – 54% on average would prefer a united state. Serbians demonstrate slightly stronger (54%) support for one state than the Montenegrins (52%). The socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees have little impact on the attitudes towards the fate of the state union ($C=0.17-0.20$). The idea of a joint entity receives highest support among those above 60, pensioners and housewives, i.e. citizens who completed elementary and apprentice schools. Montenegrins (48%) are slightly in favour of the existence of two states than Serbians (46%), presumably in the form of a peaceful and agreed separation, as are pupils and students, younger and middle generations.

On the other hand, the share of those not responding or not having an opinion is substantial (13% on average, 13% in Serbia and 14% in Montenegro). Non-response in such a contentious case could be treated as a form of avoiding giving the “presumably unexpected” answer. If we look at all cases, support for a unified state drops below 50% (46% total and in Serbia, 44% in Montenegro). Hence the compromise that was achieved temporarily postponed the final resolution of this question and has made the political atmos-

phere far less inflammable. The division of public opinion makes both options possible. The fate of the state union will depend on how opinions develop during this interval and on the ability to make a community focused on issues of European integration function successfully (assuming of course that the European Union project itself proves to be a success).

	Total	Serbia	Montenegro
One state	54%	54%	52%
Two states	46%	46%	48%
Total responses	100%	100%	100%

Table 4:
Serbia and Montenegro: what state entity?
(% of valid cases)

The fate of Kosovo

The status of Kosovo is an indispensable element of any vision of the future of Serbia. The conflict over Kosovo was one of the most traumatic social and political developments in the region for decades, making lack of consensus in the public opinion of Serbia and Montenegro understandable.

The official Serbian policy is that Kosovo is an autonomous province and an integral part of Serbia, as is stated in the Constitution of Serbia, and in the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. Broad autonomy envisaged within that framework, strengthened by the Declaration on the status of Kosovo adopted on March 26th 2004. by the Assembly of Serbia. This option is supported (Q43) by 36% of citizens with 20% undecided (all cases, because as in the case of the union between Serbia and Montenegro, non-responses could be interpreted as a cautious way of rejecting the "official" option). If only those who express an opinion are considered, this option receives the support of less than half of respondents (45%, table 5). There are reasons to expect that this level of support is more a reflection of the current official approach than an independent assessment of its feasibility. The other option of Kosovo within the Union (as a third constituent part of a loose State Union of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo) is even less realistic and supported by approximately one tenth of the citizens (8% of those who expressed an opinion and 6% of the total in Serbia, 16% of who expressed an opinion and 12% of the total in Montenegro). It seems that adoption of this option reflects the awareness that the attitude of Kosovar ethnic Albanians makes the survival of Kosovo as a part of Serbia impossible, together with simultaneous disinclination to revoke every institutional connection of Serbs from Kosovo with the parent country. What is clear here is the virtual absence of support for either "Kosovo as an independent state" or long-term continuation of the "transitional" solution of UNMIK administration that postpones resolution into the indefinite future.

	Total	Serbia	Montenegro
Kosovo as independent state	4%	4%	4%
Separation of the Albanian and Serbian parts	35%	37%	23%
Kosovo as a third member of a federation with Serbia and Montenegro	9%	8%	16%
Continuation of a United Nations protectorate	7%	7%	7%
Kosovo Autonomous Province as a part of Serbia	45%	44%	51%
Total responses	100%	100%	100%

Table 5:
What about Kosovo?
(% of valid cases)

Against this background, the option that envisages partition of Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian parts deserves special attention. While it receives the support of 35% of valid responses, among the elite respondents and respondents with higher education it is the most popular option (respectively 45% and 42% of valid responses). The strong support for this option dates back to the NATO intervention and establishment of international administration in Kosovo. The perception of the inability of UNMIK and KFOR to stabilize the situation further strengthens the belief that common life and multi-ethnic nature of the province are difficult to achieve at present. A peaceful negotiated partition seems to be the most popular

7 The survey did not, of course, assess the opinions of the population of Kosovo itself, but rather the views of Serbian and Montenegrin citizens outside Kosovo. By all accounts, Serbia and Montenegro citizens are not favorable to turn back to the status quo ante (1990-1999)


option, particularly given the support it receives from both the society at large and above all from the elite. This view is only reinforced by the March 2004 outburst of violence against Serbs and Roma resulting with many burned churches, monasteries and Serbian villages as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign⁷.

Centralized or decentralized?

The degree of the necessary decentralization of Serbia represents one of the most controversial constitutional-political disputes in Serbia. In contrast to the political elites, the question of regionalization is not among the priority issues of the citizens polled here. The concept of regionalization (reflected in the question "What do you think of dividing the country into regions?", Q45) is not known to the citizens — 44% in Serbia and 58% in Montenegro have no opinion about this issue. Those interviewees who did express an opinion heavily rejected the idea of dividing the whole of Serbia, including Vojvodina, into numerous regions, (70% do not agree, 68% in Serbia and 83% in Montenegro). On such an issue, a response of "do not know" may also reflect caution rather than ignorance, making the overall lack of support for division into different regions obvious. On the other hand the low support for regionalization could be indirect evidence of similarly low support for breaking the union into two separate states. In the case of Montenegro the very size of the republic makes it less suitable for regionalization, hence the higher percentage of people opposing it.

Results rejecting regionalization do not necessarily mean that there are aspirations for operation under a centralized state. After a decade of consecutive secessions, public opinion in Serbia is understandably cautious about any regionalization. It would be fair to say that people envisage not a centralized state but a state with a reasonable division of prerogatives between the central and the local levels. This is most obvious on the issues of education, health or infrastructure management. The cautious approach to decentralization also reflects existing regional disparities. Many municipalities are still poor and, within a drastically decentralized system, they would have worse access to social services like health and education. Support for centralized approach in this matter reflects the desire to avoid deterioration of social services provision.

Graph 6:
Who should decide on different issues?



The level of support for a central or a local approach depends on the issue. The first group of issues consists of activities that should predominantly be in the competence of municipal administration, i.e. local autonomy, such as local transportation and collecting local taxes as an autonomous source of income. Most interviewees think that these activities come under the competence of a municipality, with up to 77% of the valid cases show support for fiscal decentralization (municipalities establishing the local tax rate and collecting taxes, Q53) – perhaps among the highest in the region! Local transportation problems (Q50) should be solved locally according to 86% of the respondents who express an opinion. There is similarly strong support for municipal management of property at the municipal level (Q51, 61%). On issues demanding a more centralized approach like security and crime prevention (Q52), the choice is in favour of the central government (78% of the valid cases with no substantial differences among groups, table 6).

There is an even stronger finding regarding health care (Q47) where 83% opt for centralized provision. Only one tenth of the inhabitants believe that education should be under the competence of a municipality. The central government is rather seen playing the primary role in solving this second group of issues. It should be noted that the share of non-responses on decentralization-related issues varies between 11% (in the case of health services provision) and 17% (on issues of fiscal decentralization).

<i>Municipalities should be responsible for:</i>	Total	Serbia	Montenegro
Establishing local tax rates and tax collection	77%	78%	73%
Municipal ownership management	61%	64%	50%
Local transportation problems	86%	89%	77%

Table 6:
Decentralization aspirations

The vision revealed by the data is of a reasonably decentralized state with a substantive role of local-level government but within a clear and working centralized framework. The central government is expected to retain its responsibilities particularly in social services and security areas. Further decentralization and widening the space for local autonomy will be top-driven process (it receives a high level of support among the more educated and younger part of the population and the elite in general). But how much of it will be realized depends, first of all, on the material and personnel resources of a municipality.

The state as “provider of social safety”

The results reveal strong support for a market-based economic model with a visible role for the state. Asked “In which direction would you like the economic system of our country to develop?” (Q34), respondents showed attitudes in favour of a “free market economy” and a “mixed economic model” (a market economy with a relatively strong public sector) almost equal at 42% and 43% of the valid cases respectively. Only 4% of the respondents chose a “socialist economy”. Even with the strong role of the state, the desired economic model is market-based. People may not have developed a clear idea about the distinctions (often subtle) between the shades of the three market-based models (“pure market,” “mixed” and “state capitalism”) but they largely exclude the centralized socialist model of production relationships of the former East Europe type from their aspirations. This does not mean however a complete departure from the idea of social rights and entitlements usually associated with the social-democratic model. Data could be interpreted in this direction as well. Certain caution however is necessary in this case given the high level of non-responses to the question – 28% of the overall sample reaching 30% in Serbia. In Montenegro, where the level of non-response is substantially lower (18%), support for a mixed model and state economy is highest (respectively 35% and 11%).

The desired state role is different in various areas, with 35% expecting the state to play the role of major protagonist in the new economic system (Q35) while 39% assign this role to the private sector. Worth noting is that respondents from Montenegro tend to trust the private sector more than the state – the private sector is expected to play the major role in the new system by 42% of the valid cases compared to 25% who expect the state playing this role. On the other hand, this partially contradicts with the stated expectation that “The government should have a more important role in economic management (Q98) shared by 69% of the total valid cases, reaching 81% in Montenegro (table 7). And 94% of respondents, uniform across groups, would like to see stronger control over enterprises with monopolistic positions (Q 93), presumably by the state. All these attitudes indicate the aspiration to have an economic model with an important role for the state, which provides a consistent and strong framework within which private initiative is expected to develop gradually. The high level of non-responses (30% on average for all of those issues) suggests use of some caution in their interpretation.

There is an equally strong expectation that the state will be the “provider of social safety”. This vision directly affects the envisaged state’s priorities: asked “should social support be increased?” (Q103) 86% of the valid responses wished to see more social support from the state; 87% think that free medical treatment should be provided for everybody (Q116) with little difference among various professional and social groups on this key question. The percentage of private business owners, who support higher social investment and free health protection for all, are both above the average of the sample. And expanding social

security is named as the priority task of government (Q121) by 41% of all respondents, with investment in economic development in second place with only 32%. The high level of non-response on this question (27%) may be a worrying sign.


Table 7:
...but with a
strong state
presence

<i>Percentage of respondents who agree that:</i>	Total	Serbia	Montenegro
It is necessary to strengthen control over enterprises that have monopoly power (Q93)	94%	94%	96%
The government should have a more important role in economic management (Q98)	69%	65%	81%
Social support should be increased (Q103)	86%	83%	95%
It is necessary to provide free medical treatment for everybody (Q116)	87%	86%	91%

The vision of the “providing state” is indirectly supported by data from other questions. Asked “Who should be responsible for finding a job for your child?” (Q88), 46% of the valid cases expect the state to be responsible and only 16% see this as the responsibility of the child (10% think it is a responsibility of the parents). A similar picture emerges from the questions addressing the issue where the responsibility for individual destiny should rest – with the state or with the individual (reflected in the question “What is better: the state to have a larger role and a responsibility to provide for every citizen or the state to have a minor role and instead for the individual to take more responsibility for his/her own life?” Q73). Here 69% of the valid cases (reaching 75% in Montenegro and 79% among respondents with primary education) envisage a model in which individual citizens’ destinies would be the responsibility of the state rather than of the individual. At the same time 86% think social support should be increased (Q103) and 56% of the valid cases say that the first priority of the government (Q121) should be increasing social security, while only 44% stress “investments on economic development”. It reveals a basically social democratic mindset and little support even among business owners for an “individualistic” model of society. The state is expected to play a strategic role both as social safety provider and in taking care of the individual.

Distinctions in the attitudes towards the role of the state among different groups are not particularly surprising. The major divisions are along professional orientation and private/public sector affiliation lines. 47% of private enterprise owners opt for a “free market” model and slightly more than the average for the entire sample (38%) prefer a mixed economy. Housewives have the least confidence (only 17%) in the free market economy. The favourable predisposition toward the market system is also mildly linked to the extent of education: 44% of interviewees with higher education, but just 38% of those with primary school accept it (Q34). A free market economy is slightly more acceptable to men (34%) than to women (27%), as well as to younger categories of interviewees.

Graph 7:
The state as
caretaker?



All this suggests that from certain perspectives (particularly that of the state) the transition process in Serbia and Montenegro is still at its beginning. The public support is not for socialism but for some “intermediary” social democratic model with strong state involvement. To a certain extent, this could be attributed to the experience of the last decade when the whole society was living in a situation of constant

(weaker or stronger) alert. In such a situation, stress on the role of the state is understandable. But the prominently expressed support for a socially active and engaged state should be taken carefully into consideration as a possible constraint on the design and implementation of reform policies in the short and mid-term.

The private sector vs. the state

The strong support for a prominent role of the state in the desired society includes its role as an economic actor. The question about “who should have the leading role in the new system” (Q35) provides interesting information on the issue. At first glance, it reveals slightly stronger support for private sector – 39% of the respondents with definite opinions think the private sector should have the leading role, slightly higher than those attributing this role to the state (35%). Support for the private sector predominance is greatest among the high-income strata (50%) and young (48%), the elite (47%) and the highly educated (42%) and is lowest among respondents with primary education (29%), who are generally less competitive in the labour market and tend to rely more on state-supported employment schemes. The share of those not responding or lacking an opinion is high, 24% of the total sample.

Still, the relatively high support for the private sector is just half of the picture (table 8). A considerable share of the respondents (almost 23% for the general sample, reaching 30% in Montenegro and as low as 13% for primary education group) expects large multi-national companies to play a leading role in the future economic system. On one hand, it can reveal strong expectations in Montenegro that FDI will play a significant role in economic recovery and from formal point of view this can be interpreted as indirect support for private business, since most of these companies are private entities. But seen from aspirations perspective, the relationship could be subtler. Multi-nationals are, because of their size, often seen as large employers which, given the labour markets, are more than welcome. Hence, the support for the “multi-nationals” option perhaps reveals the expectation of unemployment reduction. If this interpretation is correct, then the relative support for the private entrepreneurship with all its attributes (risk-taking, individual motivation, responsibility, etc.) could be, above all, connected with increase or employment, with considerable consequences for the future economic model.

	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Non-elite
State	35%	38%	25%	26%	37%
Private sector	39%	38%	42%	47%	38%
Big international corporations	23%	21%	30%	26%	22%
Somebody else	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 8:
Who should play the leading role in the desired economic system?

This may reflect a hidden assumption of the “subordinated role” of private business in the process of transition and potentially in the vision of the desired society. Even among private business owners, only 47% entrust the private sector with the leading role in the process of development. To what extent this is a manifestation of the genesis of the private sector in Serbia, of the legacy of the “self-managed socially-owned enterprises” in the former Yugoslavia, or of the desired development path for the country is not clear, but the place of the private sector is now envisaged as playing a “subordinated role” in the future.

On one hand, low levels of entrepreneurship are also related to the cultural patterns in society. Competitiveness was not socially acceptable behaviour in the previous system (with the exception perhaps of sports careers). It has to do also with the gradual (and not fast) emergence of the system of values. Ten years of dictatorship were not just “one episode” ended by the elections of 2000 and the last elections were not “just another election”, so the momentum of the inherited attitudes will be there for some time to come. But on the other hand, the expressed attitudes are perfectly realistic and reflect the existing status quo: it is difficult to expect more active support for the private sector, with some shady domains, when the state is still the major employment provider.

The same conclusion is supported by the responses to the question on the desired model of labour relations (Q133) — 52% of the respondents (valid cases) prefer “safe employment in a state firm” while


employment in a private firm is remarkably unattractive — only 7% of the respondents would prefer working in a private firm with no substantive differences among groups. This is understandable given the working conditions, level of salaries, high incidence of informal employment (i.e. without social insurance and union protection) in private companies. Starting their own business is the desired option for 20% of the respondents.

There are several possible conclusions, each of which has a direct policy impact. First, the population may not be aware of the advantages of the private sector over the social and public sector. People may not see the private sector as representing high economic effectiveness and efficiency, or see how this could affect them. As in most transition economies, the negative effects of the privatisation process (the loss of benefits and employment, seizure of valuable assets and concentration of effective ownership in the hands of a small “possibly corrupt” elite, abandoned or stripped production facilities) are immediate, while positive consequences are yet to be seen.

Second, private firms may remain monopolies, connected with the public and social sector and basing their development on connections with politicians, redistribution of the ownership of existing assets and speculation. Thus far it does not carry out significant investment, create new employment or support technology development.

Third, employment in newly private firms has been drastically endangered, job dismissals are larger than new hiring, and workers are usually without basic labour rights. Fear and distrust of the private sector are based on bad first experiences.

Graph 8:
**Which is your
aspired employment
model?**



Finally, part of the population may associate the private sector primarily with crime and corruption during the first phase of the transition, based on the shady relationships between politicians and businessmen in the public sector.

Whatever the specific reason, the major conclusion is that the role of private initiative is ranked low in people’s vision of the desirable future shape of society. This is also reflected in the low levels of willingness to get involved in private business, discussed below. The private sector has not yet become a key motive and factor in national aspirations. It is still seen more as a provider of some income generation than as a dynamic source of social benefits.



Society

People would like to live in a society with lower levels of criminality and corruption (36% of valid cases), capable of providing a good standard of living (58% of valid cases), good employment opportunities (42% of valid cases), and governed by the rule of law and a fair judicial system (40%). The overlap of these categories, and ability of respondents to name up to three desirable characteristics, makes precise interpretation of the answers impractical. Assuming that “developed democracy” includes the “rule of law”, the two answers could be added together as evidence of support for democracy, making it equally important with economic well-being as imminent characteristics of the desired model of society. Aspirations related to the achievement of other long-term economic goals, which would indirectly cause the same improvements (for example, a successful economy) were less marked (33%, Table 3, based on Q11-13).

The desire for the state to play a strong re-distributive role is usually linked to social support for equity. Data for Serbia and Montenegro show the prevalence of this more egalitarian vision of society, with 70% of the respondents believing that existing income differences should be reduced (68% in Serbia and 77% in Montenegro answering “yes” to the question “Should the differences between income of the employees be reduced?” Q95). This conclusion is supported by other questions, such as the 91% of the valid cases that believe the property of those who have become rich in the last ten years should be nationalized (Q104).⁸ This echoes opinion in other countries where theft of state assets is assumed to lie behind much of the current ownership structure of large assets, undercutting popular approval of even of market economy interactions that begin on that oddly shaped “playing field”.


8 This could be explained also with the perception that most of the new capitalist classes are ex-Milošević cronies and people with shady pasts as war profiteers or common criminal.

Nationalist potential and ethnic tolerance

One of the most important findings of this survey is the diminishing significance of nationalist feelings and ideas in Serbia and Montenegro. A low share of respondents (6% with no major variations across groups) see “fulfilment of national interests” as a precondition for the desired society (Q11-13). This suggests low levels of support for nationalist appeals, seemingly revealing a crucial precondition for tolerance and respect for diversity. However, when asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statement that “Serbia should be the state of Serbs only because Serbs are the majority” (Q39), most of the respondents tend to agree (35% completely and 30% “to certain extent”). Here we have some confusion between the name of the state and its character given the belief that state should be named after the majority ethnic group like “France is the state of French people, Germany is the state of German people” and has nothing to do with treatment of minorities as second rate citizens.⁹ The competing model is Serbia as state of all its citizens. But it might be also that the nationalist potential has not vanished for good. Not surprisingly the highest support to this option is in Serbia (69% total for “completely agree” and “agree to certain extent”) and lowest in Montenegro (50%).

9 This is established in several CPA/CPS surveys not only in this one. The prevailing opinion is that Serbia should be defined as state of Serbs in which all ethnic or religious groups have the same rights. Behind this is the concept that each nation should have its “mother state” and live as minorities in several other states enjoying all human and minority rights.

Graph 9:
Serbia – for the Serbs?



The interesting question here is “What is the motivation behind the rejection of nationalism as a policy agenda?” The reality is perhaps more complicated than at first appears – some people may reject nationalism (associated with Milošević policies) because it led to nationalistic wars, but others could reject it because he lost these wars. But still there are sufficient arguments to claim that rejection of nationalism is a rational decision because the nationalistic project failed, mainly because it could not provide good living, and that now nationalistic issues cannot accumulate political energy. It could however “reincarnate” in a social populist agenda and as an approach to socioeconomic issues. What is in front of society may

be not less challenging and perhaps dangerous than what has been left behind. Populist demagogy on social issues could be used as a vehicle to power and the Survey reveals substantial potential support for such an agenda.

Additional indirect evidence of the complexity of the equal opportunity issue is the attitude towards “positive discrimination” for ethnic groups in the labour market. Asked hypothetically “In case that you have a chance to decide who will get the job...” roughly one third of the respondents would prefer domestic/majority applicant and not a vulnerable minority representative (table 6). 34% of the valid responses are for preferential hiring of a domestic applicant instead of a refugee (59% would support equal chances, 7% would give preference to a refugee, Q67); 28% would chose Serbs/Montenegrins while 69% would provide an equal chance between this majority and an ethnic minority (Q69). When that minority is specified to be Roma, 60% would support an equal chance and 36% would choose Serbs/Montenegrins (Q70).

There is substantial support for tolerance and equal opportunity, especially because categories such as “refugees”, although mostly Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, have multiple meanings (inviting the expression of all manner of unrealistic fears, going beyond know domestic minorities) while “domestic majority” is completely clear and specific. This matches other data showing that 37% completely agree and 41% agree to a certain extent with the view that Serbia should be arranged as a state of all citizens who live in it no matter what their ethnic background is (Q40). It means that society is well advanced in the painful process of “de-ethnicising” societal relations and moving toward a more pragmatic approach to reality not manipulated by nationalistic appeals. Yet, general attitude toward the Roma and sexual minorities remain to be substantially enhanced.

Social solidarity and trust

Tolerance is not limited solely to ethnic issues but is directly related to social solidarity as well. The population of Serbia and Montenegro shows a high average level of solidarity and tolerance toward others and different (marginal) social groups. Intolerance is expressed more through a reserved view towards efforts to provide equality of rights and opportunities for certain groups than through open readiness to take part in discriminating against them. In a hypothetical situation of employing someone (“If it were up to you would equal chances of getting a job be given to...” summarized in table 9), the lowest is the tendency to discriminate based on gender, with 86% prepared to give an equal chance to men and women (Q65), with only 10% giving an advantage to men. A relatively high percentage of respondents also show no tendency to discriminate against Roma and other minorities. However it must be borne in mind that 26-36% of the respondents either openly express the intention to give advantage to Serbs or may conceal this intention by refusing to answer the question (the share of non-responses reaches 22% for national minorities and 25% for Roma).

<i>Percent of respondents choosing the respective option of job equality/ advantage when choosing employment from among:</i>	Equal chances	Advantage to the first group	Advantage to the second group	Total	“No answer” as % of the total sample
Men or women	86%	10%	4%	100%	13%
Disabled or others	67%	12%	21%	100%	28%
Refugees or locals	60%	6%	34%	100%	20%
Elderly or the young	47%	6%	47%	100%	17%
Minorities or Serbs/Montenegrins	69%	3%	28%	100%	22%
Roma or Serbs/Montenegrins	60%	4%	36%	100%	25%

Table 9:
The extent of social solidarity and tolerance
(% of valid responses)

Solidarity with the disabled seems to be high, with 67% supporting equal opportunities (Q66, “In case that you have a chance to decide who will get the job, would the disabled have equal chances compared to those who are not disabled?”), but the substantial percentage of 28% who fail to declare themselves on this issue suggests that there is a greater lack of solidarity concealed because it is socially inappropriate to articulate such a position. There is also a somewhat higher tendency to discriminate against refugees

in comparison with the local population. This may be explained by problems and tension triggered by the high rate of unemployment in the country, but because the opinions of the unemployed are not much different from the position of other groups there are doubts about this interpretation, leading back to the possibility that what is reflected is fear of the unknown rather than "local" minorities.

On the other hand, the population of Serbia and Montenegro shows a moderate level of social and interpersonal trust, which is an important element of social capital. Social trust or distrust shapes expectations about how others will behave in a situation where there is insufficient information about them. Trust implies that the expectation that the behaviour of others towards us will be predictably friendly while distrust is the expectation that their behaviour could be damaging or unpredictable.

Corruption and rule of law

Among the parameters of the "desired society", aspirations include a high, almost general, acceptance of the "rule of law" and justice. "Reduced crime and corruption" is second with 61% of respondents choosing this option. The other thematically related answer of "the rule of law" receives 28% of the valid cases in the question "Which of the goals listed below should be achieved in order to create a society in which you could be happy to live?" (Q11-13). Given the complementary nature of the two options, **the role of a functioning legal system and transparent societal relations are extremely high in the respondents' vision of the desired society**. Rejection of corruption is also expressed in the nearly unanimous (98% of the valid cases) support for higher sentences for criminal acts and corruption (Q96). There is a definite support for a model where the laws and rules are equally applicable.

Table 10:
Potential for active
corruption

<i>If you had an important problem and official directly asked you for money to help you, what would you do?"</i>	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Citizens
I would pay anyhow	3%	3%	6%	5%	3%
I would pay if I had the money	16%	16%	16%	14%	17%
I would not pay if I have any other way to solve that problem	27%	27%	26%	31%	26%
I would never pay	37%	37%	38%	32%	38%
I would report him to the police	17%	17%	14%	19%	16%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

A similar picture emerges when people are asked about their possible participation in corrupt practices. Asked hypothetically "If you have an important problem and an official directly asked you for money to help you, what would you do?" (Q 58, table 10), more than half of the respondents answer "I would never pay" if an official asked for money to solve an important problem (37% of the valid cases) while another 17% would report such case to the police. Only 19% would pay (in any case or if they had the money). For another 27% paying for an official to do the job is acceptable as a "last resort" if there is no other way to solve the problem. On the other hand, the share of those who are hypothetically ready to engage in passive corruption (accepting a bribe, asked "Would you take money if you were an underpaid official, Q59, table 11) is much lower than the share of those who are ready to give (12%). So, regardless of the perspective (active or passive corruption), there is a stable segment of less than 30% of the population which is ready to participate in both passive and active corruption. The majority rejects the various forms (54% active and over 70% passive) of corruption. Hence there are reasonable grounds to expect that in the vision of the desired society corruption is an act deserving condemnation and to a far lesser degree is viewed as an inevitable "rule of the game" required to "grease the mechanism of administration."

Options chosen for the question: "Would you take money if you were an underpaid official?"	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Citizens
I would accept, everybody does that	4%	4%	7%	2%	5%
I would accept if I could solve the problem	8%	8%	11%	8%	8%
I would not accept, if the solution of the problem involved breaking the law	16%	16%	17%	15%	17%
No, I do not approve of such acts	71%	72%	64%	75%	70%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 11:
Potential for passive corruption

The interesting question however is how such a vision correlates with the expectation for a stronger role of the state, including stronger state (administrative) control. From certain perspective there is no major contradiction in the issue of a larger role of the state (control) and rejection of corruption. People obviously perceive the state primarily as a controlling apparatus and a framework capable of curbing corruption within its own mechanisms, through tighter control (93%, think that "it is necessary to increase discipline in the workplace," Q113) and 98% think sentences for criminal acts and corruption should be higher (Q96). This reveals a somewhat idealistic but hopeful picture of both the state and the desired society within which it fits. In a non-transparent environment, or where the civil service is impoverished or demoralized, more institutional control can open a way for corruption (following the logic "more state control – more administrative difficulties – more opportunities to demand "payment for assistance"). The image of the "robber state" is sometimes used as an argument against seeking to establish a coherent state, but is in fact the counsel of total despair and abandonment of hope in building a healthy society. If "governance" and support for its improvement is to have any operational significance, it must be in cases like this. The respondents generally view the correct role of the state in the new system to be actively protective and facilitative, imposing proper standards on society and its individual members. This is an agenda for governance reform that matches both the realities of their circumstances and the dimensions of their hopes of being able to live in a "normal" society.

Work attitudes and culture

There are two major dimensions of survey responses on the issues of work culture and attitudes, reflecting the two major aspects of working – "how to work?" and "what to work for?" Regarding the first question, the respondents' vision of the desired society is the one of hard-working people, working harder or at least more than is currently the case. The extent to which this reflects dissatisfaction with the unemployment situation (the absence of the opportunity to work) or with the character of the work effort of those who are employed is difficult to judge from these questions. The transitional nature of attitudes towards the state is reflected in views on the working atmosphere and work discipline. The majority of the people think that it is important (79% of the valid cases, with 62% saying "very important") that people work harder so that economic prosperity is achieved in the next decade (Q18).

This view that it is necessary to work harder in order to achieve positive results is a truism of all successful companies (private and public), sports teams and armies, and in no way indicates "market readiness" or adoption of "free market values". Freed from the latter ideological expectations, survey results are easier to reconcile with the expectation of a strong state role that pervades other findings. A decisive majority of 93% thinks that "discipline in the workplace should be improved" (Q113), and a substantial majority of 82% valid cases supports the idea of firing those who do not work hard in order to hire younger people (Q111). Such attitudes are consistent with the old socialist triad "order, work and discipline at all levels" also present in the former Yugoslav economic model, despite its market elements. On the other hand the support for "working discipline" could be interpreted as indirect rejection of the chaos years under the Milošević regime as well as the chaotic beginning of the transition when theft and cheating became regular survival tactics. Whatever the reasons, after years of transition it makes little difference whether these are "pre-market" or "market" attitudes – they should be taken into consideration.

The views of respondents on their motivation for work gives a fuller sense of the degree to which market values have been internalised and of the impact that current economic difficulties have on public attitudes. When choosing between income and security (Q72), 61% of the respondents would prefer a secure job regardless of the salary and only 39% are prepared to accept a less secure but higher income job. In an economic environment with official unemployment levels over 32% and unofficial figures over 45% it is not particularly surprising that people assign a higher value to stability and predictability than to risk with possibly greater rewards. The capacity for or interest in undertaking entrepreneurial activity is notoriously difficult to judge from such data, but it is at least possible to say that there is little evidence of widespread enthusiasm for small business ownership as a way of life. Seen from this perspective, there may not be consistent support for reforms, especially those aimed at liberalization of the labour market.

A similar socially-oriented picture emerges from the question addressing the need to establish private pension and health funds, which is supported by a slim majority of 56% of the valid cases and only 37% of total survey participants (Q118). This correlates with the high share of people (86% of valid cases) who want to see more social support, thereby envisaging that the state will take on more responsibilities rather than reducing its role (Q103).



Social involvement: willingness to work for a public cause

“Leave me alone” could be the phrase summarizing individual attitudes toward active involvement in social life, with 84% of the respondents choosing this option and only 6% stating explicit willingness to be active in an association, group or society (Q132). Asked hypothetically what type of social action people would take part in, 38% cite “work for improved labour rights”, followed by 34% who would take part in an environmental action. Surprising for a country involved until recently in a violent conflict, only 15% would take part in a peace movement (Q130). This does not mean that people do not care about peaceful conditions¹⁰ – for 77% peace is a “very important” precondition for economic prosperity in the next decade (Q19). The low level of peace activism may reflect optimism about the future, in which violent developments are not expected.

At the same time, a negligible number of respondents would like to participate in “organized forms” such as political parties or trade unions to carry out such actions. This means that the desired model of civil activity is apparently individual action, not working through an institutional framework. To a certain extent, this correlates with the strong role envisaged for the state, suggesting that citizens see themselves as members of a broader state entity and not as members of smaller groups with specific interests.

It is worth noting that most of the people are willing to make some sacrifices for a social cause such as protecting the environment. Asked “Would you be ready to renounce part of your personal income for

¹⁰ Just one example: the “Black Ribbon” protest against the Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo in 1992 had more than 100.000 protesters in the streets of Belgrade at the height of the Milošević regime!

the protection of nature and the improvement of living environment?" (Q62), only 37% of valid cases think that this is the responsibility of the state and are not willing to devote part of their income for environmental cause. The rest demonstrate willingness to devote part of their income to a different degree (20% are ready to do that unconditionally and 43% state readiness under the condition that they have sufficient levels of income). The readiness to devote income to a social cause is correlated with the income level — the "No" response is 27% for the high-income and 41% for the low-income group (31% in urban and 45% in rural areas). It should also be noted that environmental awareness still remains somewhat of an elite attitude (table 12).

Options chosen for the question: <i>"Would you be ready to renounce part of your personal income for the protection of nature and the improvement of living environment?"</i>	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Elite	Non-elite
Yes, because it is one of the most important problems today	20%	22%	15%	30%	19%
Yes, but only in the case of a sufficient level of individual living standard	43%	42%	47%	49%	42%
No, because this is the concern of the state or a general legal obligation	37%	36%	38%	21%	38%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 12:
Environmental awareness

The readiness to get involved in a public cause usually goes hand in hand with environmental awareness, which seems to be high. The willingness of people to devote part of their incomes to environmental protection reveals also the importance of environment in desired society. Other data suggest the same – when asked if they would move to another place for environmental reasons (Q63), 22% would definitely do so, while for an additional 58% this decision is conditional upon the seriousness of the problem. Another issue related to environmental protection is the necessity to have nuclear power complexes in the country (Q94) – 81% of respondents with clear opinions believe nuclear power plants are not necessary to solve electricity shortages. There is almost universal support (93% of the valid cases) for passing more stringent environmental regulations (Q102).

These responses indicate that environmental considerations are an important factor in the aspirations for their future society, but there is no reason to believe that this goes beyond the expression of a general concern about major environmental issues. It is not clear to what extent these ecological concerns have been internalised by citizens, because the information on the environmental capacities of the country and sustainable development is not widely known, and short-run economic considerations have a different priority.

Family and personal aspirations

People are not satisfied with their current standard of living, divided evenly between those assessing their life as “good” or “tolerable” and those who find it “hardly sufferable” or “insufferable”. This is the reason why the Survey researchers team was looking beyond simply stating certain parameters of the “desired family” and focused instead on how these assessments differ depending on individual and societal status and what are the specific “building blocks” of different aspirations, what are the feasible ways of achieving them.

The first years of the post-Milošević era in Serbia were dominated by uncritical assessments of the present and unrealistic expectations concerning the immediate future. A gradual sobering up of the population then occurred. When asked in this survey “How do you and your family live now?” a scant tenth of the citizens of both republics reply “well”, approximately forty per cent describe conditions as “tolerable”, about the same number of people evaluate their life as “barely tolerable” and about ten per cent describe their life as “intolerable” (Table 13). What had been a normal distribution of answers (with most respondents opting for moderate options and a number dropping away towards the extremes) has evolved into a clearly bimodal distribution. This means that the public is divided in their evaluation of the level of satisfaction with their present standard of living, falling into at least two major groups: those who currently find their situation to be tolerable (among whom a smaller number report living well) and those who are living very difficult lives, among whom many describe their current situation as intolerable.

An interesting detail of current views is visible in the disparity between the assessments of personal and household conditions and the appraisal of conditions in the surrounding society. People tend to perceive their situation more optimistically than that of “the neighbour” or the rest of the society. This is a sign of higher levels of “individual optimism.” The share assessing their own status as “good” and “tolerable” is higher than the assessment those same people provide of the conditions of the “others”. There are fewer “pessimists” in assessing their own status than there are “pessimists” about the conditions of the society in general.

Table 13:
Perception of personal (household) circumstances as compared to the surrounding society
(% of all cases)

	Household situation			Society situation		
	Total	Serbia	Montenegro	Total	Serbia	Montenegro
Good	10%	10%	12%	6%	7%	4%
Sufferable	39%	38%	40%	26%	24%	34%
Hardly sufferable	39%	39%	38%	45%	46%	42%
Insufferable	11%	12%	9%	20%	20%	17%
N/A	1%	1%	1%	3%	3%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Assessments of expected improvement of living standards reveal similar differences between individual and societal perspectives (table 14). The data demonstrate cautious optimism about prospects for improvement in the short run (five years) with substantively higher expectations regarding the long-term. A very high number of people (more than a third, regarding the situation in the next ten years) are unable to say anything, answering “do not know”. This suggests either a high level of uncertainty about the future or a lack of familiarity with this type of distant hypothetical formulation.

Table 14: **Expected improvements in the standard of living**
(% of all cases)

	In 5 years life will be:		In 10 years life will be:	
	Individual	Society	Individual	Society
Good	21%	17%	31%	27%
Sufferable	28%	27%	20%	22%
Hardly sufferable	17%	19%	9%	9%
Insufferable	7%	7%	6%	6%
Do not know	27%	30%	34%	36%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

The data show two major groups of people with quite different assessments of their life situation. The first group expresses greater satisfaction with their standard of living and shows more optimism about the future, and is dominated by the young, the educated, the entrepreneurs, private sector employees, and students. Those least satisfied, with lowest aspirations and the highest level of uncertainty about their own future and life, are citizens over sixty years old, other pensioners, the unemployed and housewives. The level of education and material status, which are very closely linked, are of crucial importance for the type and degree of aspirations for personal (family) living standards.

Levels of satisfaction

Assessments of the current situation are directly linked to the feeling of satisfaction with one's life in general. The level of satisfaction is related but not identical to the assessment of external circumstances of living reflected in the previous questions. Satisfaction with one's own life in general and the feeling of happiness refer to a general perception of subjective prosperity which is a result of summing up of satisfaction which a person draws from different aspects of their life. Subjective dissatisfaction with their own life does not always reflect objective external circumstances of the respondent. The perception of subjective prosperity reflects changes in the livelihood of a person over time. Objective changes in the short term – for better or worse – produce immediate satisfaction or dissatisfaction. But circumstances, which endure for some time, gradually change the level of individual aspirations concerning a particular area of life. Subjective aspirations adjust to objective circumstances.

Asked about satisfaction with their life (Q136), most respondents tend to choose a "so-so" answer – neither satisfied, nor particularly unsatisfied (44% of valid responses). The other responses are 31% "satisfied" or "very satisfied" vs. 25% "unsatisfied" and "very unsatisfied". It is paradoxical that a similar distribution of the feeling of satisfaction with life (with a larger group of moderately satisfied and fewer extremely satisfied and extremely dissatisfied people) is also typical of the populations of more economically developed countries. This shows that Serbian and Montenegrin populations have already adjusted their aspirations to unfavourable external living conditions. Minor differences between various socio-economic categories in their level of satisfaction in life point to a similar process of adjustment of aspirations, which to a certain extent cancels the influence of external factors. This "collapse of expectations" is to some extent an empty semantic point. Expectations (a realistic assessment of what is likely to happen) and aspirations (what would be considered desirable) are clearly not the same thing, but are mixed together in these responses.

Although women, elderly and less educated citizens are assumed to speak from a disadvantaged position compared to men, the youth and those more educated, the first are not much more dissatisfied with their lives. Vocation has greater influence on the level of dissatisfaction, with unemployed workers and housewives showing far more dissatisfaction than entrepreneurs and private sector employees, although not more than pensioners and farmers. The data also show that the level of satisfaction with life is not entirely associated with money: although the differences in the level of satisfaction between the relatively wealthy (monthly income of more than 522 US\$ (30,000 Dinars)) and the poor (monthly income of 87US\$ (5,000 Dinars) or less) are huge, this is not the rule in other cases.

The reduced aspirations of the country are also reflected in the relatively modest level of expectations that personal standards of living could improve in the near future and the high level of uncertainty about the future. Asked "Do you think that in the next five to six years you will be more satisfied with your life?" (Q137), 6% do not see perspectives for improvement and 34% do not know (which could be also interpreted as a lack of prospects). This brings the share of those not seeing a definite prospect for improvement close to 40%. The relative optimists, those who believe that "there is a slim chance that I will become more satisfied in five to six years time," constitute 43%. Only 17% expect that "there is a strong chance that I will be more satisfied". Montenegrin respondents show rather more optimism in this regard: 23 per cent believe that there are opportunities for them to live much better in the future than they presently do, 48% think there is a chance for some improvement while in Serbia the distribution is 15 and 42 per cent respectively.



Attitudes toward business risk – the enterprising spirit and relation to business

The majority of citizens do not appear eager to take on business risk. The attitude towards business differentiates two groups of inhabitants: a quarter is involved in business (16% of the valid cases) or are “about to start or are trying to start” (17%), while three fourths are completely “out of business”. More than a half of the citizens do not even think about business or consider that there are no chances for them. They are very close to those who “think about business”, but consider it infeasible in practice or do not see opportunities for their occupational skills in small-scale industry or trade. Together they make up approximately one fifth of the inhabitants. Asked “Do you think that you will start your own business in the future? (Q74), two thirds of the respondents have no aspirations for business, either they have not thought about it or have not seen any chance in it, or concluded that they have some unfavourable circumstances for business. They seem to make up classical “work force for hire”.

Asked in a separate question about the preferred employment model (Q133), only 14% of all respondents explicitly state that they would prefer to start their own business. The main reasons for the low level of interest in private business are the lack of capital (26% of all cases) or that “I am too old to start private business” (13% of all responses). Other possible barriers such as “no security in private business” or “too much corruption in private business” are not mentioned often. “Lack of capital” is a universal problem of small business, with limited access to bank credit and high interest rates are often the case in many countries. In most developing countries, small businesses are often founded almost exclusively on the basis of “own-resources”, in the form of savings or funds supplied by family members or friends. The same is likely to be true in Serbia and Montenegro, especially with recent interest rate increases from 9% to 13% annually.

Loans are one of the possible sources of capital, but 72% of respondents in this Survey do not envisage taking out a loan (Q76). Of those who are prepared to borrow, 7% would take a loan to start a business and 16% to purchase some durable property (apartment, automobile, furniture or appliances). This could reveal a stronger predisposition to borrow for business purposes than directly reported, since small business might be financed with consumer loans.

Education and career aspirations


Parents have high aspirations regarding the education of their children. Asked “What is the best level of education for your child?” (Q84), 79% of the respondents from Serbia and 81% in Montenegro (valid cases) think that the appropriate education for their children is university level. The reasons for this choice (Q85) are related to better opportunities associated with higher education: to find a job (25%); to acquire higher level of job security (19%) and simply to acquire knowledge (19%). It is interesting that “money” as a motive comes only fourth – perhaps because transition experience provides little evidence to support the relationship between higher education and a higher income. In this respect, people’s aspirations regarding education of their children reflect the old tradition (particularly in newly modernized societies) of perceiving education as a value in itself, even if it does not provide direct material benefits. Culture and prestige, although present among the reasons for parents’ educational aspirations regarding their children, do not influence substantially the orientation for university education.

Educational aspirations are intrinsically related to vocational aspirations. The latter were examined through offering opportunities to choose among three occupations that parents would recommend to their children. Distribution of answers points out that parents vocational aspirations are rather exclusive – their ambitions are reduced to one choice and that one choice amounts to two occupations: “physician” and “dentist” are the first and “businessman” is the second (Q80). When the answers covering similar occupations are merged, half of them are made up of these two groups: “doctors, dentists, and medical personnel” and “managers and entrepreneurs”.

Unlike the case of educational aspirations, money is decisively first among the responses to the question “Why this particular choice of occupation?” (Q83) (42%) among the possible motives of professional aspirations, well ahead of options like security (17%), pleasure (17%) and promotion/career opportunities (13%).

Attitudes about Emigration

Majority of respondents (58% of the valid cases) state that they do not want to leave or to go abroad providing a negative answer to the question “Are you thinking about leaving Serbia?” (Q55). This share is substantially lower than in Montenegro, where only 41% definitely want to stay. What about the rest?



Graph 10:
Emigration attitudes?

Almost a quarter (22%) wants to move but does not have the opportunity. Another 13% intend to try to leave the country. The segment that has actually decided (those with a clear plan and who are in the process of making arrangements) constitutes just 7%. Among the reasons for leaving the country (Q57), economic reasons prevail – a low standard of living (14% in Serbia, 16% in Montenegro); followed by the lack of future prospects (7% and 11% respectively), unemployment (4% and 7% respectively), safer life “abroad” (4% both), education and vocational specialization (2% and 6% respectively). Only 1% would like to leave for political reasons. Among preferred destinations, European countries are predominant, but it is worth noting that 14% in Serbia and 20% in Montenegro are ready to go “anywhere”!

However, the picture emerging from these results is a bit more complicated. On the one hand, there are reasons for considering the emigration potential to be much lower than it would appear from the sum-

ming up of figures (decided, intending, and willing). Data from other questions suggest reducing the share of the potential emigrants to 10-15%. For example asked, "Where would you like to live?" (Q131) 13% (11% in Serbia and as high as 21% in Montenegro) of the valid cases are for "living abroad." Even fewer respondents (10%) would "go abroad to earn more money". On the other hand, emigration attitudes are not equally distributed across age groups. A substantial number of young people still see (and are willing to look for) more opportunities abroad. Such a "brain drain" could be detrimental for the future of Serbia and Montenegro if it turns into a stable tendency, given that it is the best educated with the most wanted skills, who are the most prone to leave the country but also the most needed for its development.

All this suggests that emigration is not among the envisaged scenarios for most of the people. Translated into the language of aspirations, it means that the definite majority sees their personal future in the country expecting to find sufficient opportunities here (and not to look for them abroad). This is an optimistic message but at the same time – a window of opportunity for policy-makers that could not last forever.

Aspirations to leave the country are primarily connected to the age of the interviewee ($Ck=0.37$); foreign countries are a preoccupation of the youth. Half of young people (precisely 52%) want to leave the country and then, the percentage reduces according to decades to 40%, then 32%, then 19%, amounting to only 12% among those who are more than 60 years old. Thus, it is not only the "brain drain" but also the "energy for change drain"!

Family relations and gender equality

A strong majority of respondents want to live in marriage, with more women preferring marriage security than men (Tables 15, 16). The desired model of family is larger than current European norms, with 38% preferring 2 children, 27% supporting 3 children and 9% wishing more than three (Q79, "How many children would you like your child to have?"¹¹). The population is both aging and decreasing in size due to the low current fertility rate. The extent to which the aspiration for relatively large families will be realized depends on the overall progress of reforms in Serbia and Montenegro.

11 The family model was investigated through the prism of their "children's future". Respondents were asked to point out certain parameters not for their own family but what they desired for their children.

Table 15:
Preferred type marriage
(% of all cases)

Options	Female	Male
Not to marry	1%	4%
To live together without marrying	2%	3%
To live in marriage	68%	61%
To live in a loose marriage with the possibility of leaving	3%	5%
To be married and have a lover	2%	3%
Do not know, no answers	25%	24%
Total	100%	100%

Table 16:
Preferences about family composition
(% of all cases)

Options (%)	Total
To live alone	2%
To live in marriage without children	1%
To have one child	6%
To have two children	36%
To have a family with more than two children	33%
Do not know, no answers	22%
Total	100%

Gender relationships are an important area of family and societal patterns. The data show a generally high level of awareness, but with substantial differences between men and women regarding the state of gen-

der equality. Women are less inclined than men to think that gender equality exists (Table 17). Worth noting that on this issue the share of non-response is remarkably low (within 5%). However, this awareness has not turned into a motive for action – the share of women not doing anything in this regard is 8% higher than the share of men (table 18). Those intending to do something about gender equality in the future are at the negligible level of 3% for both sexes. Hence, gender issues could be perceived as important in the desired society but action in this regard is still to be seen.


<i>Percentage of all valid responses choosing one of the following options:</i>	At home	In society
I do nothing and I can do nothing	19%	28%
I always try to respect and fulfil the equality	15%	16%
I will try to change the things in this area	2%	3%
Equality exists	64%	53%
Total	100%	100%

Table 17:
Gender equality at home and in society
(Q60-61, valid cases)

<i>Percentage of all respondents choosing one of the following options:</i>	Female	Male
I am not doing anything nor can I do anything	31%	23%
I am trying to respect equality of the sexes	16%	13%
So far I have done nothing but I will in the future	3%	3%
We already enjoy equality of the sexes	44%	58%
Total	100%	100%

Table 18:
Gender equality in society as seen by women and men
(Q60, % of valid cases)

When cross-tabulated with the demographic characteristic of the respondents, data show that the age of respondents and educational level are correlated with gender equality awareness. The more educated the people are, the more they are inclined to support equality of the sexes, while older people are less ready to accept gender equality. The only deviation from this general rule is found in the younger generation. One possible explanation could be indeed lower gender awareness due to various reasons (for example young people being socialized in the time of the Milošević regime or over-individualistic attitudes spreading among the youth). Another could be the asymmetry in life chances of women in different age groups with young women having more opportunities reflected in higher incidence of the statement “equality exists” option for the question “What do you think about gender equality in society?” (Q61) among the youth.



Graph 11:
Gender equality?

In the area of gender equality the real finding is the huge discrepancy between individual/family and societal patterns. The share of those “doing nothing” for gender equality at home is substantially lower than of those “doing nothing” about gender equality in society (Table 11) 11% more people think that equality exists at home than they think it exists in society. One possible explanation could be that at home women’s rights are perceived as better protected and equality closer (the share of those thinking that equality exists at home is also 11% higher than those thinking the same is the case in society). But this is also the case with some other judgments when the individual or family situation is seen as better than the situation in society.

This means that at least the awareness that something still needs to be done in this area exists. The problem however is that even if this is the case, a negligible share of respondents (both men and women) intend to do anything about that. Indirect evidence of the existing asymmetry in the perception of gender equality and women's rights is found in the "right to abortion" question¹². The share of male respondents who believe that women should not have the right to make such decisions is 20% higher than the share of female respondents (Table 19).

Table 19:
**Should women
decide about
abortion?**

	Female	Male
Yes	66%	46%
No	11%	31%
Do not know, without answers	22%	24%
Total	100%	100%

The prospect for gender equality looks better in the area of economy and workplace. The share of those supporting equal employment opportunities (Table 20) is high and almost equal for female and male respondents. 77% and 74% would give an equal chance to workers of both sexes if they were hiring an employee (Q65). But 12% of men would give an advantage to the male job applicant, while only 2% would advantage a female worker. It is striking that more women would give preference to men in employment than to women. One possible explanation could be that women still lack the necessary self-esteem. The other is the momentum of old stereotypes giving men higher "ranking" on issues of productivity or competence.

Table 20:
**Gender equality
in the labour market**

<i>Percentages of responses to the question: If you are to decide, would male and female applicants have an equal chance to get the job?</i>	Female	Male
Yes	77%	74%
No, male worker would have advantage	6%	12%
No, female worker would have advantage	4%	2%
Do not know, without answers	13%	12%
Total	100%	100%

¹² The Survey did not assess opinion on the "right to life" of the unborn. It should be noted that the Global Convention on the Rights of the Child refers to the necessity of the State to protect children before as well as after birth. Although abortion is legalized and common in many countries, there is no universal international consensus on the acceptability of abortion as a method of family planning, let alone any universal recognition that it constitutes a so-called human right. There is in fact no UN system policy adopted to support such a practice. Legislation exists in some countries to uphold the accountability of persons to protect the right of life of the unborn child.

Instead of a conclusion: Are these visions feasible?

To what extent are the expectations and aspirations outlined above feasible? And what policies and approaches can be deployed to increase the chances of favourable outcomes? Generally, the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro are moderately optimistic about their own prospects – 43% of the respondents in Serbia and 48% in Montenegro are confident about the possibility of achieving their goals in the near and mid-term future (5-10 years). More than a fourth of the population in both republics does not seem to have any faith in the feasibility of their projected social goals and expectations, while only around ten percent have significant faith in this sense. This leads to the general conclusion that the public is moderately optimistic. However, the answers to the question: “What would Serbia be known for in five years time?” show another and, more pessimistic possible outcome. The highest percentage of answers fall within the category “I do not know” (29% in Serbia, 18% in Montenegro). Those who offer definite opinions mostly cluster around negative scenarios such as “corruption and criminality”, “massive poverty”, and “political crisis and instability”). Positive options like “developed democracy”, “high standard of living” or “island of stability in the Balkans” are not frequently cited.

That does not mean that the positive and hopeful visions and aspirations of the Serbian and Montenegrin people are not feasible. The vision of a Europe-centred and prosperous state is feasible but not predetermined. The survey provides sufficient ground for optimism, which leads us to say that the outcome is still open. This is the reason why a debate on this issue is so important. It is particularly important to nurture small-scale steps towards development that give people a reason to believe that their actions matter in what happens next to their society. Trust is essential and currently in short supply.

Without transparency in the practice of government and informed public consensus to the major developmental decisions that must be built rapidly in the next few years, it is difficult to imagine a happy outcome. This fragile but not hopeless situation makes it particularly incumbent for international donors and advisors to avoid imposing or assisting a self-appointed elite in enforcing social and economic policies that lack broad social consensus. The implications concerning privatisation, pensions and welfare reforms, the reorganization of public services, etc., are clear.

With the revival of economic growth and employment generation as obvious priorities, it is useful to note the extent to which successful transition economies have depended on maintaining or reviving internal demand and local production for local consumers. Expectations that small enterprise growth will be self-starting or self-sustaining are not realistic. Successful SME growth beyond services and petty retail trade requires active support and some degree of attention to securing access to domestic consumers. Equally unlikely is a magical transformation triggered by direct foreign investment, which has played that role in none of the successful post-World War II development cases. Even those transition economies that have succeeded in attracting real, green field foreign investments have found very few spillover effects on the local small enterprise sector. Restarting local production and making sure that privatisation augments existing capacities rather than simple changing ownership is essential, but argues against rapid general privatisation which has been successful nowhere in transition countries.



The Survey reveals little support for an “individualistic” model of society. The expectation for the state to play a strategic role as social welfare provider does not necessarily require that state-owned enterprises should remain major economic actors. A dynamic mixed economy should leave room for diverse organizational and motivational approaches. The population should be allowed to choose among various forms of ownership and organization that are neither state-owned nor individual private ownership, such as cooperatives, full or partial local government ownership of public utilities and in some cases local production facilities, and so on from the Scandinavian model. The unique experience of the former Yugoslavia with various forms of employee participation and local government economic activity should not be needlessly totally discarded without a careful filtering to preserve those fragments that are potentially viable and forward looking. Various localized cooperative forms are a particularly promising way to build multi-ethnic engagement and commitment to activities and entities that require inter-communal amity.

The Survey indicates that there is little belief in the legitimacy and competence of individual and party political actors or support for adoption of a sharp-edged “free market” model. Attempts of the former to impose the later, however welcomed from abroad, are unlikely to contribute to the re-establishment of a functioning civil society of informed assent and real participation. When such important structure-determining decisions are being made, transparency in government conduct and public understanding of and basic agreement with the choices made are especially important.

Nonetheless, if government truly believes that specific far-reaching reforms with major social consequences are necessary, then it has the obligation to engage in a broad-based dialogue with the stakeholders in the public and civil society, and to enable a participatory process to resolve crucial issues democratically. This was the pioneering experience of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process, as a broad-based consultative one, and should be replicated in other policy and reform areas. It is also a quintessentially contemporary European way of practicing democracy in public policy.

The benefit is broad-based support for modified approaches which achieve strategic goals, reconcile major interests, satisfy peoples expectations, make government look good, and obtain sustainable outcomes that bring Serbia and Montenegro into or closer to the European Union. And as this survey shows, that is what most people aspire to.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

JMS 03/03 (July, 2003)

1-2. Questionnaire number.

3-4 Election-pool number.....

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY – Summer 2003

How do you and your family live at present and what are your expectations for the future?

	Good	Sufferable	Hardly sufferable	Insufferable	Do not know
5. Present	1	2	3	4	5
6. In five years	1	2	3	4	5
7. In ten years	1	2	3	4	5

What is your judgment of the situation in our society today? What do you expect from the future?

	Good	Sufferable	Hardly sufferable	Insufferable	Do not know
8. Present	1	2	3	4	5
9. In five years	1	2	3	4	5
10. In ten years	1	2	3	4	5

11-13. Which of the goals listed below should be achieved in order to create a society you will be happy to live in. What kind of society would you like for your children/grandchildren? Please choose three answers and list them in significance. Mark the most ultimate goal with number 1, less ultimate with number 2, and the third goal you have chosen mark with number 3

- ___ Developed democracy
- ___ Good possibilities for employment
- ___ Political stability in Serbian society –clear and stabile situation at the political scene
- ___ Legal state – rule by the law and fear judicial system
- ___ Good standard of living
- ___ To decrease as much as possible the level of criminal and corruption
- ___ Successful economy with strong economic development
- ___ Social justice
- ___ National interests achieving
- 0) Do not know, do not think about it

14. Do you believe that goals you have chosen will be successfully realized in next five to ten years? To what extent are you confident in?

- 1) Complete confidence 2) Middling confidence 3) Have no confidence
- 4) Do not know, not sure

15. Are you interested in politics?

- 1) Yes, to a great extent 2) Considerably 3) A little bit 4) Very little 5) Not at all 6) Do not know/Can not estimate

16. In your opinion, how large is the influence of government decisions on you and your life on the whole?

- 1) Very strong influence 2) Moderate influence 3) Not particularly important influence
- 4) No influence at all 5) Do not know

17. Speaking in general, would you say that this influence on your life is good or bad?

- 1) Very good 2) Good to a certain degree 3) Not sure 4) Bad to a certain degree 5) Very bad

In the next ten years, what is going to be crucial for the economic prosperity of our country?

Mark from one to five (one is the lowest and five is the highest mark)

18. Serbian people working harder and more seriously 1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

19. Peace and stability in the country 1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

20. An end to political quarrels and the normal functioning of the government 1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

21. The activities of the non-governmental sector and citizens (NGOs, trade unions, citizens associations...)

1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

22. More foreign investments, World Bank and IMF policy 1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

23. More help from the European Union 1 2 3 4 5 6. Do not know

24. Is it possible to achieve: Serbian people working harder and more seriously – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

25. Is it possible to achieve: Peace and stability in the country – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

26. Is it possible to achieve: An end of political quarrels – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

27. Is it possible to achieve: More foreign investments – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

28. It possible to achieve: more help from European Union – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

29. Is it possible to achieve: A more effective non-governmental sector (trade unions, NGOs...) – and when?

1) Now 2) In the next five years 3) In the next ten years 5) Never

30. Which of the countries listed below should be a model to Serbia and Montenegro?

- | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|---|---------------------------|
| 1) Asian countries | 2) USA | 3) Russia | 4) Scandinavian countries |
| 5) West European countries | 6) Latin America | 7) Central Europe an countries (Poland, Hungary, Check Republic...) | |
| 8) None of the above | 9) Do not know | | |

31. Do you support the opinion that Serbia and Montenegro should become a member of the European Union and NATO?

- | | | |
|---|----------------|--------------|
| 1) It should be a member of EU and NATO | 2) Only EU | 3) Only NATO |
| 4) Neither | 5) Do not know | |

32. Which of the reasons listed below is the largest obstacle for Serbian and Montenegrin membership of the European Union? (Only one answer)

- 1) We use Cyrillic letters
- 2) Military industry
- 3) National law is not sufficiently harmonised with EU law
- 4) High crime rate
- 5) The lack of high standards and quality control
- 6) Our economy is not developed enough
- 7) Worker productivity is lower then in Europe
- 8) Orthodoxy
- 9) The prices of products and services, such as, electricity, telephony, agricultural products are to low
- 0) Do not know

33. Do you think that Serbia/Montenegro is going to be known in five years as:

- 1) An island of stability in the Balkan
- 2) A highly developed democracy
- 3) For its high standards
- 4) For widespread corruption and crime
- 5) For fast economic growth

- 6) For widespread poverty
- 7) For political crises and instability
- 8) For an undeveloped economy and poverty
- 9) For isolation and separation from Europe and World
- 10) Do not know

34. In which direction would you like the economic system of our country to develop in next few years?

- 1) Free market economy (complete competition with maximum participation of the private ownership)
- 2) Mixture economy (private sector and a moderate to strong public sector)
- 3) State capitalism (the state have a main role and the major part of the capital)
- 4) Socialistic economy (self-management or other means of control)
- 5) Other?.....
- 6) Do not know

35. Who should play the biggest role in the establishment of this economic system?

- 1) State 2) Private sector 3) Huge multinational companies
- 4) Something/Someone else? 5) Do not know

36. Which one of the goals listed below is the most important to you? (one answer only)

- 1) Effective economy (high productivity and international competitiveness)
- 2) Economic stability (minimum of inflation and a stable currency)
- 3) High rate of employment
- 4) Social justice (a just distribution of national income, free medical service, free education, support for the poor...)
- 5) Environmental protection and investment in sustainable development (harmonizing goals with environmental concerns)
- 6) Other?..... 7) Do not know

37. In your opinion does Serbia and Montenegro currently have the rule of the law and are the judicial proceedings fair, and if not, when do you expect it?

- 1) We have the rule of law and we have fair proceedings
- 2) We still do not have it, but I expect it in about five years time
- 3) We still do not have it, but I expect it in about ten years
- 4) Significant improvements will occur in far future or maybe never
- 5) I do not expect anything, / Do not know

38. In what kind of society (state) would you like to live?

- 1) A state with a powerful president, elected through direct election, who makes the decisions without the influence of the Assembly
- 2) Experts, instead of the politicians, who know what is the best for the country
- 3) The army ruling the country, at least for a short period
- 4) To have a political system where the Assembly (directly elected members of the parliament) is more important than the president and the government
- 5) To have a king, while the assembly and the government make the decisions 6) Do not know

39. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: «Serbia should be the state of only Serbs because Serbs are the majority»?

- 1. Completely agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Not sure 4. Disagree to some extent 5. Completely disagree

40. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Serbia should be arranged as a state of all citizens who live in it no matter what nationality they are "

- 1. Completely agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Not sure 4. Disagree to some extent 5. Completely disagree

41. Are we going to have mass protests and agitations as a result of the adverse socio-economic situation?

- 1) Yes 2) No 3) Can not estimate, do not know

42. Serbia and Montenegro are going to be: 1) One state OR 2)Two states 3) Do not know

43. In your opinion what is the best solution for Kosovo?

- 1) Kosovo as independent state
- 2) Separation on Albanian and Serbian part
- 3) Kosovo as a third member in federation of Serbia and Montenegro
- 4) Continuation of the UN protectorate
- 5) Kosovo Autonomous Province as a part Serbia
- 6) Other..... 7) Do not know

44. You have probably heard about argument for an independent and autonomous Vojvodina.

What do you think about that?

- 1) Vojvodina should never be allowed to become autonomous
- 2) We should keep present state,/status quo
- 3) Vojvodina should have more autonomy than it currently has
- 4) Do not know, do not think about it

45. What do you think about the division of whole Serbia, including Vojvodina, in numerous regions, instead of existing division in autonomous provinces and central Serbia?

- 1) I do not agree 2)I agree 3) Do not know, do not think about it

Which of the following problems the municipality should solve and which the Government?

- 46. Education:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 47. Healthcare:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 48. Culture:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 49. Traffic:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 50. Public transport:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 51. State property on the municipal territory:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 52. Public security, safety, criminal:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know
- 53. The amount and collecting of local taxes:** 1) Government 2) Municipality 3) Do not know

54. In your opinion who will in mostly represent interests of citizens?

- 1) Political parties 2) Non-governmental organizations 3) Professional societies
- 4) Assembly and elected assembly members 5) Government and its ministries
- 6) Court 7) Media – press, radio, television 8) Others 9) Nobody

55. Some people are thinking about leaving Serbia/Montenegro and going to the foreign countries, some people are not.

What is your attitude about it?

- 1) I did not think about that
- 2) I do not want to leave Serbia/Montenegro
- 3) I want to move to foreign countries, but I do not have a chance
- 4) I will try to leave, but I do not know if I will succeed
- 5) I have clear plan fro going abroad
- 6) I am in the process of arranging the departure abroad

56. If you do like to go abroad (answers 3,4,5 and 6 in previous question) which country would you prefer?

- 1) I do not want to leave from Serbia 2) I want to go to:..... 3) I want to go anywhere

57. Which is your main reason for leaving Serbia/Montenegro? (One answer)

- 1) Because of further education, vocational specialization
- 2) Because of low standard of living
- 3) Political reasons
- 4) Unemployment
- 5) I do not have any perspective in this country
- 6) Life is safer abroad
- 7) I do not want to leave Serbia

71. Are you afraid of being discharged or are you sure about your working position?

- 1) I am sure about my working position 2) I am afraid of being discharged 3) I am unemployed

72. What is better: 1) Secured job, regardless of salary **OR**

- 2) Job that can be profitable, no matter if the position is unsecured 3) Can not make the choice

73. Which is the better? 1) That the state has a large role and a responsibility to provide for every citizen **OR**

- 2) That the state has a minor role and instead the individual takes more responsibility for his or her own life
3) Cannot make a choice

74. Do you think that you will start your own business in the future?

- 1) I already have my own business
2) No, I don't have an opportunity to do that
3) I am thinking about that but at the moment, it is not practically possible
4) I am trying, but I don't know if I will successes
5) Soon I will start own small business
6) It is not possible to start a small business in my profession/field
7) I haven't thought about it

75. If interviewee responded with 2, 3 or 4: Why not?

- 1) I am too old to start a private business
2) I don't have money for it
3) There is no security in private business
4) I wouldn't know what business to start
5) I don't have the skills necessary to run the firm
6) There is too much corruption in private business
7) The state has put up obstacles for private business
8) There are no fixed working hours
9) Private business in Serbia and Montenegro is for selected people only
10) I am worrying about racketeering
11) Other

76. Do you plan to take a loan in the next five years, if so for what?

- 1) Purchase of house, flat 2) Starting a business 3) Furniture
4) Health 5) Education 6) Wedding
7) To purchase a car 8) Other 9) I do not plane to take a loan

77. If you plan to take the loan, what monthly interest rate can you afford? Specify.....

78. Are you worried for your children's future?

- 1) I am not 2) Yes I am 3) I do not have children

79. How many children would you like your child to have? Write.....

80-82. If you had a child, what professional career would you like him/her to develop?

Choose three options

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Factory worker | 2. Doctor, Dentist | 3. Salesman | 4. Health worker, physiotherapist |
| 5. Policemen, Soldier, Fireman | 6. Teacher | 7. Business man | 8. Entrepreneur |
| 9. Public administrator | 10. Sportsman | 11. Politician | 12. Banker |
| 13. Reporter/News writer/Journalist | 14. Tourist worker | 5. Professor | 6. Scientist |
| 17. Farmer | 18. Social worker | 9. Something else, what?..... | |
| 20. Do not know | | | |

83. Why that choice?

1. Money 2. Prestige 3. Free time 4. Security 5. Pleasure
6. Promotion opportunities, career development... 7. Do not know

84. In your opinion, which is the best level of education for your child?

- 1) Primary school 2) Three years secondary school
3) Some other four years secondary school 4) University 5) Do not know

85. If you think it is university – please specify why?

- 1) Knowledge 2) Prestige 3) Security 4) Money 5) Better chance to find a job
6) Culture 7) Connection 8) Avoiding serving the army 9) Not specified type of education
0) Do not know

86. Do you think it is normal for your child to change work place several times during life? If yes, how many?

- 1) I do not think it is normal 2) 1-2 3) 3-4 4) 5 and more 5) do not know

87. What advice would you give to your child/grandchild in case he/she cannot find a job or in case he/she is fired?

- 1) Wait for better opportunity 2) Study or get qualification for better job
3) Start any business 4) Go get social help
5) Start your own business 6) I do not know

88. Who should be responsible for finding job for your child or grandchild?

- 1) Schools and universities 2) Companies 3) Independent business centre 4) State
5) Municipality 6) Child 7) Family 8) Do not know

89. Which of the following group you would not like to have as neighbours?

- 1) People who don't belong to my national group 2) Refugees
3) People of other religions 4) Criminals
5) Persons who belong to other race 6) People with AIDS
7) Persons whose political opinion is different from yours 8) Homosexual
9) I don't mind that any of these persons be my neighbour

90. Generally, would you say that you are?

1. Very happy 2. Quite happy 3. Not very happy 4. Do not know

91. Has the world changed with time since your parents was children?

1. Today is worse 2. The same 3. Today is the better 4. Do not know

92. How do you think the future will compare with today?

- 1) It will be worse 2) The same as today 3) It will be better 4) Do not know

We all have different ideas about what happiness and the 'good life' is.

Similarly, we can imagine a society where we would be happy for our children to grow up.

What kind of a society is that?

Please use the table below in order to sketch out the boundaries of this society.

	Necessary	Not necessary	Do not know
93. It is necessary to strengthen control over all enterprises which do have monopoly	1	2	3
94. We do need nuclear power plants in order to solve the lack of electricity	1	2	3
95. The differences between income of the employees should be reduced	1	2	3
96. Sentences for criminal acts and corruption should be longer	1	2	3
97. Sentences for traffic and other citizen violations should be more	1	2	3
98. The government should have a more important role in economic management	1	2	3
99. Our country should strength its defence forces	1	2	3
100. Women should have complete freedom in abortion decisions	1	2	3
101. Employees (in state as well as in private enterprises) should be equally represented in the management as the employers are	1	2	3

102. Environmental laws should be stricter	1	2	3
103. Social support should be increased	1	2	3
104. The property of those who have become rich in last ten years should be nationalized	1	2	3
105. The property nationalized during communism should be given back to the owners	1	2	3
106. Sentenced members of the Chetnic movement from World War II should be freed	1	2	3
107. Military expenditure should be reduced	1	2	3
108. It is necessary to provide more media freedom and independence	1	2	3
109. Homosexuals should have more rights	1	2	3
110. The role of the church and religion should be more important in children's education	1	2	3
111. All employed who do not work hard enough should be discharged in order to employ the young	1	2	3
112. Youth should be educated in the spirit of patriotism	1	2	3
113. It is necessary to increase discipline in the workplace	1	2	3
114. Public schools and universities should be shut down (and private school and university network should be enlarged)	1	2	3
115. Obligatory military service should be cancelled. We need to establish professional military forces	1	2	3
116. It is necessary to provide free medical treatment for everybody	1	2	3
117. People who have only one child should pay extra tax	1	2	3
118. It is necessary to establish private pensions and health funds	1	2	3
119. We do not need military forces – we need neutrality and disarmament of our country	1	2	3
120. Further obligations of our country should be limited	1	2	3

121. One question we hear often these days is: What should be the priority of the government? Should it be increased social security for citizens or increased investments in economic development. What do you think?

- 1) Increased social security should be the priority
- 2) Investments in economy development should be the priority
- 3) Do not know

122. Do you think that it is better for our country to harmonize foreign policy with USA, with European Union, or that we should have complete independent foreign policy?

- 1) USA
- 2) European Union
- 3) Independent foreign policy
- 4) Else?.....
- 4) Do not know

123-125. When you heard "to live like all normal people", what do you think on? Or, what would you like to have and to achieve in order to have a decent life? (Maximum three answers)

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 1) A lot of children | 2) An interesting job | 3) A close group of friends |
| 4) A well paid job | 5) A full social life | 6) A good sex life |
| 7) A happy marriage | 8) Fun, entertainment | 9) Good health |
| 10) To have respect and power | 11) To be famous | 12) To be rich |
| 13) None of these | 14) I do not think about these things/do not know | |

If you could choose, freely how would you like to live in the future?

(Which of the following statements is closest to your wishes)

126.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. I do not want children and do not want to get married | 2. I want to get Married, but not to have children |
| 3. I want one child | 4. I want two children |
| 5. I would like more than two children | 6. I do not think about these things |

127. It is most important for me to have a strong relationship with and respect from:

- | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. My family | 2. My relatives (close family) | 3. My neighbours |
| 4. My closest friends from my workplace/school | 5. All of them | 6. Or I do not think about this |

128.

1. I want to have an income that will satisfy my elementary needs for food and clothing.
2. I want to have an income that will enable me to furnish my house
3. I would like an income that would enable me to buy a car and drive it when ever I wanted
4. To have an income, which would enable me to travel and take vacations
5. I would like an income high enough so that I do not have to think about how much I spend.
6. I do not think about this

129. I want my children/grandchildren to:

1. Finish primary school 2. Finish high school 3. Have University degree 4. To become doctors
5 to continue education abroad 6. Or none of these, I do not think about this.

130.

1. To take part in an environmental movement 2. To take part in a peace movement
3. To campaign for gay rights 4. To work for improved labour rights
5. To work for an anti-globalisation group 6. Or none of the above

131.

1. Live in a village 2. Live in a small city 3. To live in a bigger city
4. To live by the sea 5. To live abroad 6. Other

132.

1. To mind my own business 2. To be active in a association, group or local society
3. To be active in a Trade Union. 4. To be a member of a political party
5. To have a paid political function 6. Or none of these

133.

1. I would like to have safe employment in a state firm 2. I want to work in a private firm
3. Most of all I want to work in a foreign firm 4. I want to go abroad so that I can earn more money
5. I hope to start my own business 6. None of these

134.

1. To get a job 2. To keep my current job 3. To be respected at work
4. To be expert in my field. 5 To be successful 6. Other

135.

1. I never want to get married 2. I would like to live with a partner, but not to get married
3. A happy marriage is my priority 4. I want an open-marriage
5. I want to be married and to have a lover at the same time 6. I do not think about these things

136. How satisfied are you with your life?

Mark from one to five (one is the lowest and five is the highest mark)

- 1 2 3 4 5 6. do not know

137. Do you think that in the next five to six years you will be more satisfied with your life?

- 1) Its good now, I do not want that to change
2) There is a slim chance that I will become more satisfied in five to six years time
3) There is a strong chance that I will be more satisfied
4) Do not know

138. Regardless of reality, How would you like to improve your satisfaction?

Mark from one to five (one is the lowest and five is the highest mark)

- 1 2 3 4 5 6. do not know

139. Gender: 1) Female 2) Male

140. Age:

- 1) 18-29 years old 2) 30-39 years old 3) 40-49 years old 4) 50-59 years old 5) 60 and more

141. Marital status: 1) Single 2) Married 3) Divorced 4) Widow

142. Education:

- 1) did not finish primary school 2) primary school 3) Vocational school (years) 4) high school (four years)
5) College 6) university

143. Training:

- 1) Farmer or village housewife 2) Unskilled worker 3) Skilled worker 4) Technician (high school four years)
5) Office worker (high school four years) 6) Expert (college or university) 7) Housewife 8) Student (high school or university)
9) Other

Appendix 2: Bibliography

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